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LEGISLATION... is enacted, it is true, from an experience of evils but its
general language should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form
that evil had theretofore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence
new conditions and purposes. Therefore a principle, to be vital, must be
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capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. "'
I. INTRODUCTIONA stechnology evolves, society is confronted by a broad spectrum
of new problematic conduct with which legislatures and courts
often struggle to keep pace. 2 Internet activity has presented
novel legal dilemmas, especially when such activity is compared to tradi-
tional conceptions of civil and criminal law.3 In many situations, there is
little, if any, precedent for addressing harm that has been facilitated or
magnified by dramatic advances in online technology. 4 As a result, the
elemental constructs, confines, and remedies of cyberlaw are still in a
state of dynamic expansion.5
A growing area of development in this terrain of law involves statutory
safe harbor and Good Samaritan provisions that have been interpreted to
limit the liability of Internet and online service providers for certain tor-
tious or infringing conduct of their service users.6 Prominent examples of
federal legislation with these types of statutory provisions include the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)7 and the Communications
Decency Act (CDA).8 In many instances, federal courts have construed
these statutory provisions of the DMCA and the CDA broadly, granting
service providers protection from liability for a variety of copyright in-
1. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
2. See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 839 (2010) (dis-
cussing the dynamic relationship between emerging technology and the development of
the law).
3. See Patricia S~inchez Abril, Recasting Privacy Torts in a Spaceless World, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 1, 46 (2007) (discussing the courts' struggles with new issues in technology in
both criminal and civil matters).
4. See, e.g., David Hunn & Joel Currier, Law Lags as Taunts Ruin Lives, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 19, 2007, at B1 (explaining how cyberbullying could not be the basis
for a state criminal prosecution as it had not yet been addressed by the Missouri
legislature).
5. See, e.g., Adrian McCoy, Cyberspace Becoming a Legal Battleground, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZEITE, July 5, 2008, at Al ("Unlike other areas of commerce that can turn to
historical traditions to help settle disputes and guide the development of the law, the law of
the Internet has no history to fall back on.... As a result, the legal principles governing...
cyberspace are still in a state of flux.").
6. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-190, at 19 (1998) (explaining its reasoning in the creation
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as "[r]ather than embarking upon a wholesale
clarification of these [common law copyright infringement] doctrines, the Committee de-
cided to leave current law in its evolving state and, instead, to create a series of 'safe
harbors,' for certain common activities of service providers").
7. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2006) (providing the Online Copyright Infringement Lia-
bility Limitation Act (OCILLA) safe harbor provisions, which outline the conditions of
safe harbor protection for Internet and online service providers from copyright infringe-
ment liability).
8. See Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (providing immunity to
Internet and online service providers for claims related to publication of third-party cre-
ated content under its Good Samaritan provision).
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fringement claims9 and state law claims.10 A significant example of this
type of construction of the DMCA was at the basis of the landmark deci-
sion in Viacom International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.1
These types of DMCA safe harbor decisions have provoked-and will
continue to create-considerable controversy regarding the proper bal-
ance between Internet freedom and the safeguarding of individual rights
in a cyber medium.12 Given the high stakes of these decisions,13 it is
likely that future industry, scholarly, and media commentary will concen-
trate on whether or not there has been congressional nearsightedness 14 or
judicial overreaching15 in the area of statutory limitation of liability provi-
sions for Internet and online service providers. Although the participants
in this debate represent a divergent spectrum of perspectives,'
6 most of
these participants agree on the malignancy of cyber-harms and the impor-
tance of maintaining legal rights even in the context of evolving Internet
technology.' 7
9. See, e.g., lo Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1155 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (finding that the defendant was entitled to safe harbor protection from the copy-
right infringement lawsuit premised on user-generated content on the defendant's
website).
10. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (finding
that Craigslist was entitled to CDA immunity in a public nuisance lawsuit brought by Cook
County Sheriff Thomas Dart based on content that allegedly solicited prostitution).
11. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(finding that the defendants were entitled to safe harbor protection pursuant to the
DMCA).
12. See, e.g., David Ludwig, Shooting the Messenger: ISP Liability for Contributory
Copyright Infringement, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 478, 2 (2006) (arguing that
cases involving narrow judicial interpretation of the DMCA safe harbor provisions risk a
"significant chilling effect on ISP investment in the internet").
13. See David Carr, Heedlessly Hijacking Content, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at BI
(discussing the $1 billion remedy sought in the Viacom lawsuit and Viacom's announced
intention to appeal the decision).
14. This type of critical analysis will likely center on the DMCA's failure to achieve its
legislative purpose. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 49-50 (1998) ("The liability
of on-line service providers and Internet access providers for copyright infringements that
take place in the on-line environment has been a controversial issue. Title II of the
[DMCA] addresses this complex issue. Title II preserves strong incentives for service
providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with copyright infringe-
ments that take place in the digital networked environment. At the same time, it provides
greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for infringements
that may occur in the course of their activities.").
15. See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Google Wins Round One Against Viacom, FORBES (June
24, 2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2010/06/24/google-viacom-youtube-lawsuit-
opinions-contributors-ronald-a-cass.html (arguing that the Viacom court's "capacious read-
ing of the [DMCA's] quite limited insulation of Internet site operators creates a harbor
broad enough to sink the protection copyright holders had enjoyed under the law").
16. Compare id. (advocating for narrow judicial interpretation of the DMCA) with
Ludwig, supra note 12, 2 (advocating for broad judicial interpretation of the DMCA).
17. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 15 (describing intellectual property rights in the context
of Internet technology as "cornerstones of successful societies"); see also Ludwig, supra
note 12, 1 80 (discussing the important value of protecting intellectual property rights in
the context of Internet technology). But see Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture
of the Masses: A Manifesto for User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921,
935-36 (2009) (arguing that all direct appropriations of copyrighted work as posted on
YouTube should be considered "fair use" rather than copyright infringements).
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Essentially, it is this infringing behavior by users, which disregards
others' intellectual property rights,' 8 that has been the genesis for DMCA
safe harbor-related litigation involving Internet and online service prov-
iders.19 This root cyber-harm needs solutions. While a statutory amend-
ment or a Supreme Court interpretation of the DMCA might clarify the
rights of service providers in the context of DMCA safe harbor-related
litigation,20 these measures do not squarely address the underlying prob-
lem of user-generated copyright infringement. Additionally, while the
DMCA conditions safe harbor eligibility on an adopted, reasonably im-
plemented, and announced account termination policy for repeat infring-
ers,21 mere account termination in its present form is not a sufficient
deterrent to online copyright infringement. 22 Apart from these avenues,
aggrieved copyright owners can continue to pursue direct liability law-
suits against the infringer.23 However, this solution often is a fruitless
one, given both the anonymity and solvency issues that can arise in an
Internet direct copyright infringement lawsuit. 24 The question then be-
comes what other remedies might be available to deter infringing conduct
by users of an online medium.
This Article explores the ways in which Internet and online service
providers could contribute to the deterrence of online user-generated
copyright infringement, and also proactively avoid future DMCA safe
harbor-related litigation for infringing user conduct, via strengthened
18. Online conduct that constitutes pure copyright infringement is the target of this
Article, as the author recognizes the lawful validity and importance of fair use of copy-
righted material. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The reform strategy that is advanced in this
piece does not include the proposition that user agreements should incorporate contractual
provisions that conflict with this important ideal. See, e.g., Bradley E. Abruzzi, Copyright,
Free Expression, and the Enforceability of "Personal Use-Only" and Other Use-Restrictive
Online Terms of Use, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 85, 87-88 (2010)
(discussing the types of user agreements that "essentially allow private parties to override,
unilaterally and in their favor, the careful balance U.S. copyright law strikes between pro-
prietary rights and public privileges").
19. Throughout this Article, "DMCA safe harbor-related litigation" will refer to cases
that are brought against Internet or online service providers; that are precipitated by user-
generated copyright infringement; and that involve a determination as to whether the In-
ternet or online service provider qualifies for DMCA safe harbor protection.
20. Indeed, the original intent of the enactment of OCILLA within the DMCA was to
provide clarification to the "[djifficult and controversial questions of copyright liability in
the online world." Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004).
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006).
22. See Annemarie Bridy, Graduated Response and the Turn to Private Ordering in
Online Copyright Enforcement, 89 OR. L. REV. 81, 83 (2010) (discussing how past efforts to
curb online copyright infringement have not "made much of a dent" in this tortious
behavior).
23. See Lateef Mtima, Whom the Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Cop-
yright Protection over Internet Privacy in Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61
RUTGERS L. Rv. 627, 637 (2009) (discussing the substantial number of direct copyright
infringement lawsuits that have been filed since the 1990s).
24. See id. at 638 (citing "the growing number of quasi-anonymous (and often judg-
ment proof) individual infringers" as one reason why copyright owners started to sue In-
ternet and online service providers for user-generated infringing content).
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user agreements. 25 This type of contractual deterrence strategy would re-
quire modifications to the status quo of transactional practices within the
Internet industry. Fortunately, the Internet allows for relatively swift and
easy changes on the part of service providers. 26 Specifically, this ap-
proach could be accomplished through changes to the model of user
agreements that would require more evidence of users' assent to the
agreements and increased security measures for identity verification. In
addition to these model changes involving contract formation, this ap-
proach would require robust contractual drafting with the inclusion of
remedies for users' infringing conduct that are more stringent than the
current provisions addressing termination of user accounts. Further, this
approach would require actual enforcement of the user agreement when
there is a breach by a user posting infringing content. Finally, Internet
and online service providers would need to adopt integrated marketing
campaigns to increase the transparency of their efforts to curb cyber-
harms that are perpetrated via their services.
The adoption, enforcement, and publication of contractual deterrent
measures would result in manifold benefits for Internet and online ser-
vice providers. This approach would demonstrate the good faith of these
entities by reinforcing the culpability of the infringer, rather than the
electronic forum provider. Further, adopting this approach would carry
with it a pragmatic benefit. Essentially, if these contractual deterrents are
an effective means to curb online copyright infringement (the root harm
at issue in DMCA safe harbor-related litigation), then these measures
could commensurately curb the number of copyright infringement law-
suits that are filed against service providers.
In summary, Part II of this Article briefly introduces the present state
of the law involving DMCA safe harbor eligibility through the lens of the
Viacom case. In addition to providing the relevant background for this
Article, this Part specifically explores the account termination policy re-
quirements under the DMCA and how they have been construed. This
Part concludes by examining the reasons why Internet and online service
providers should do more than meet the basic requirements for DMCA
safe harbor eligibility. Part III provides a practical approach, via contract
formation, drafting, and enforcement, for increased deterrence of copy-
right infringement by online service users. This Part advocates for the
implementation of stronger user agreements by Internet and online ser-
vice providers. By analyzing the terms of use that are currently employed
by these entities, this Part recommends integrated reforms to online ac-
25. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Separating the Sony Sheep from the Grokster
Goats: Reckoning the Future Business Plans of Copyright-Dependent Technology Entrepre-
neurs, 50 AMz. L. REV. 577, 579 (2008) (suggesting that the Internet industry may start to
adopt "proactive avoidance measures" as a way to protect businesses from liability for
user-generated copyright infringement).
26. See William R. Mills, The Decline and Fall of the Dominant Paradigm: Trustworthi-
ness of Case Reports in the Digital Age, 53 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 917, 929 n.49 (2009)
(describing the nature of most websites as "constantly changing, [and] evolving").
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count creation, maintenance, and termination. Specifically, this approach
advocates for (1) increased mechanisms to evidence assent by the user to
the user agreement; (2) additional security measures for identity verifica-
tion in account creation; (3) more transparent provisions on account ter-
mination; (4) the inclusion of liquidated damages clauses; (5) the open
enforcement of current indemnification provisions and other remedial
provisions; and (6) increased marketing of these efforts.
Such an approach would preserve the flourishing of Internet free-
dom,27 thereby insulating commercial and speech protections, while con-
temporaneously allowing for increased safeguarding of intellectual
property rights.28 Additionally, by curbing user-generated copyright in-
fringement, such an approach could lead to a reduction in the number of
lawsuits that are filed against service providers where the causes of action
are premised on this type of user behavior. 29 It is this pragmatic reason-
ing that should provide Internet and online service providers with the
impetus to adopt, enforce, and market stronger user agreements.
II. WHY INTERNET AND ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS
SHOULD DO MORE TO DETER USER-GENERATED
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT THAN MEET THE
DMCA'S THRESHOLD REQUIREMENTS
FOR SAFE HARBOR ELIGIBILITY
A. VIACOM INTERNATIONAL INC. V. YouTUBE, INC.
On June 23, 2010, a groundbreaking decision was issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York in Viacom
International Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.3 0 In this $1 billion copyright infringe-
ment case, 31 Viacom sought to hold YouTube and Google liable for the
27. This is an important and valuable aspect of advances in digital technology. The
intent of this Article is not to paint Internet and online service providers as being bad
actors, but rather to investigate how these entities can contribute to the deterrence of on-
line copyright infringement. Inarguably, these entities provide considerable benefits to
millions of people. See, e.g., Nadia L. Luhr, Note, Iran, Social Media, and U.S. Trade Sanc-
tions: The First Amendment Implications of U.S. Foreign Policy, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV.
500, 511 (2010) ("Because of these tools [Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube], news consum-
ers were able to learn of the events taking place [in the 2009 Iranian elections and their
aftermath] from sources other than heavily censored or state-sponsored media and were
able to engage in open communication with those undertaking a massive civil rights move-
ment against a repressive regime.").
28. These types of contractual avoidance measures would help ease the significant
concerns that have been stressed in discussion of the DMCA safe harbor provisions. See,
e.g., Ludwig, supra note 12, at %1 1-2.
29. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Safe Harbor Defense at 1-4, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103) (premising claims of liability on the foundation of user
copyright infringement).
30. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
31. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages
and Demand for Jury Trial at 19-29, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103).
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unauthorized user-posting of thousands of Viacom's copyrighted works to
YouTube's website. 32 The defendants moved for summary judgment,
claiming that they qualified for DMCA safe harbor protection pursuant
to 17 U.S.C. § 512.33 Viacom contested this assertion in its cross-motion
for summary judgment. 34
Although the court stated that "a jury could find that the defendants
not only were generally aware of, but welcomed, copyright-infringing ma-
terial being placed on their website," 35 it ultimately granted the defend-
ants' motion for summary judgment on all claims of direct and secondary
copyright infringement based on a finding of DMCA safe harbor protec-
tion.36 At the heart of this finding was a statutory construction of 17
U.S.C. § 512(c)(1), which provides:
(1) A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or,
except as provided in subsection (j), for injunctive or other equitable
relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the
direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network
controlled or operated by or for the service provider, if the service
provider-
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an ac-
tivity using the material on the system or network is infringing;
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts
or circumstances from which infringing activity is apparent; or
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expedi-
tiously to remove, or disable access to, the material;
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the
infringing activity, in a case in which the service provider has the
right and ability to control such activity; and
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in par-
agraph (3), responds expeditiously to remove, or disable access to,
the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of
infringing activity. 37
For the court, the key issue was whether the language in § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)
and (ii) "mean[s] a general awareness that there are infringements (here,
claimed to be widespread and common), or rather mean[s] actual or con-
structive knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of individ-
ual items." 38
32. See id. at 9, 20-29 (providing that Google owns YouTube, Inc.); Defendants' An-
swer to First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 5, Viacom Int'l Inc. v.
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103) (providing that
"Google acquired YouTube, Inc. for $1.65 billion in a transaction announced on October 9,
2006 and closed on November 13, 2006").
33. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 516.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 518.
36. See id. at 529 (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and denying
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment).
37. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
38. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 519.
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Prior to resolving this central question, the court made some prelimi-
nary determinations outlining the applicability of the DMCA safe harbor
provisions to the defendants. After finding that YouTube met the
DMCA safe harbor definition of a service provider "as 'a provider of
online services or network access, or the operator of facilities there-
for," 3 9 the court also determined that YouTube had complied with the
DMCA notice and takedown provisions.40 With these initial findings in
place, the court proceeded to interpret 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). Relying
largely on the legislative history of the DMCA, the court determined
"that the phrases 'actual knowledge that the material or an activity' is
infringing, and 'facts or circumstances' indicating infringing activity, de-
scribe knowledge of specific and identifiable infringements of particular
individual items. Mere knowledge of prevalence of such activity in gen-
eral is not enough."'4'
Consequently, the court determined that YouTube had complied with
the requirements of the statute and was therefore entitled to safe harbor
protection. 42 In issuing its opinion, the court stressed that, absent an on-
line service provider's "knowledge of specific and identifiable infringe-
ments of particular individual items,"' 43 which necessitates removal of the
infringing material, copyright owners have the burden to identify in-
fringement to online service providers. 44 The court made clear that
"[g]eneral knowledge that infringement is 'ubiquitous' does not impose a
duty on the service provider to monitor or search its service for
infringements. 45
In a concluding section of the opinion, the court also briefly addressed
Viacom's argument that YouTube was not subject to DMCA safe harbor
protection as it had not adopted and implemented a reasonable policy for
the termination of accounts of repeat infringers.46 Under 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(i), in order to be eligible for safe harbor protection, a service pro-
vider must "[have] adopted and reasonably implemented, and [inform]
subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or net-
work of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circum-
stances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's
39. See id. at 526 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(B) (2006)).
40. See id. at 524 ("[T]he present case shows that the DMCA notification regime
works efficiently: when Viacom over a period of months accumulated some 100,000 videos
and then sent one mass take-down notice on February 2, 2007, by the next business day
YouTube had removed virtually all of them."); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(2), (3) (2006)
(providing the DMCA required notification and takedown procedures).
41. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 523.
42. See id. at 526 (reaffirming YouTube's protection under the DMCA safe harbor
provisions).
43. Id. at 523.
44. See id. at 525 ("[I]f a service provider knows (from notice from the owner, or a 'red
flag') of specific instances of infringement, the provider must promptly remove the infring-
ing material. If not, the burden is on the owner to identify the infringement.").
45. Id.
46. See id. at 527-28.
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system or network who are repeat infringers. ''47
YouTube's termination policy was a "three strikes" policy by which a
repeat infringer's account would be terminated "after warnings from
YouTube (stimulated by its receipt of DMCA notices) that the user [had]
uploaded infringing matter. '48 Upon termination of the account, "You-
Tube remove[d] all of that user's videos, not merely those against which
allegations of infringement have been levied, and it permanently
block[ed] the account from being reestablished. ' 49 The court found that
YouTube's policy, which counted "as only one strike against a user both
(1) a single DMCA take-down notice identifying multiple videos
uploaded by the user, and (2) multiple take-down notices identifying
videos uploaded by the user received by YouTube within a two-hour pe-
riod, '50 qualified as a "reasonably implemented" policy that allowed
YouTube safe harbor eligibility.51
B. DMCA SAFE HARBOR ELIGIBILITY UNDER 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)
Viacom is not the first case to address the conditions for DMCA safe
harbor eligibility under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i). However, it is one of a limited
number of decisions to do so, which makes the question of satisfactory
adoption and implementation of account termination policies in order to
qualify for safe harbor eligibility a far from settled one.52 In order to
qualify for DMCA safe harbor protection, an entity must meet the
threshold account termination policy requirements of § 512(i).53 Such a
finding is an imperative prerequisite to the question of qualification
within the safe harbor.54 However, many of the key terms of § 512(i) are
not defined by the statute; these terms include "reasonably imple-
47. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2006).
48. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527.
49. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
at 23, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-
02103).
50. Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 527-28.
51. See id. at 528.
52. See Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Social Networking Web Sites and the
DMCA: A Safe-Harbor from Copyright Infringement Liability or the Perfect Storm?, 6 Nw.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 15, 33 (2007) (describing the case law interpreting the require-
ments of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) as "sparse").
53. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1109 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing
that a threshold condition for eligibility under the DMCA safe harbor provisions is compli-
ance with 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)).
54. See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1080-82 (9th Cir. 2004) (reversing a dis-
trict court's summary judgment in favor of America Online, Inc., based on a finding of
DMCA safe harbor limitation of liability due to triable facts on whether the defendant met
the threshold requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i), and remanding to the trial court the ques-
tion of said eligibility); see also UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 620 F. Supp.
2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that "[m]ost cases that have addressed the § 512(c)
safe harbor have examined whether the defendant meets the prerequisites enumerated in
§ 512(c)(1)(A-C) and § 512(i)").
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mented, ' 55 "appropriate circumstances, '5 6 and "repeat infringer."'57 Ad-
ditionally, the legislative history on this subsection does not provide clear
guidance as to its meaning:
[T]he Committee does not intend this provision to ... suggest[]
that a provider must investigate possible infringements, monitor its
service, or make difficult judgments as to whether conduct is or is not
infringing. However, those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their
access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual property
rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of losing
that access.58
Given the lack of specific definitions in this subsection, especially com-
pared to the detailed requirements of the statute as to infringement no-
tice and takedown procedures in § 512(c), qualification for DMCA safe
harbor eligibility under § 512(i) rests largely on judicial interpretation.59
Because only a handful of courts have examined the meaning of this sub-
section's requirements, those decisions, like Viacom, are particularly val-
uable for this developing area of law. In fact, the case law in this area is
in such an unsettled state that at least one court has denied the discretion-
ary award of attorneys' fees pursuant to the Copyright Act to prevailing
parties that have been deemed to meet the § 512(i) requirements and the
remaining DMCA safe harbor conditions. 60 Consequently, it is impor-
tant to discuss the approaches of the relatively few decisions, which, in
examining other Internet and online service providers' account termina-
tion policies, have provided additional or differing interpretations of the
requirements of 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
The most recent circuit court examination of the meaning of this sub-
section took place in 2007. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held "that a service pro-
vider 'implements' a policy if it has a working notification system, a pro-
cedure for dealing with DMCA-compliant notifications, and if it does not
actively prevent copyright owners from collecting information needed to
issue such notifications. '61 Further, the court found that "[t]he statute
55. See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109 ("The statute does not define 'reasonably
implemented."').
56. See id. at 1111 ("Section 512(i) itself does not clarify when it is 'appropriate' for
service providers to act.").
57. See Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1100-01 (W.D. Wash.
2004) ("The key term, 'repeat infringer,' is not defined and the subsection never elaborates
on what circumstances merit terminating a repeat infringer's access.").
58. H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998); see also S. REP. No. 105-190, at 51-52
(1998) (providing a similar discussion on this statutory provision).
59. See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (discussing how the "open-ended language [of
§ 512(i)] contrasts markedly with the specific requirements for infringement notices and
take-down procedures set forth in § 512(c)").
60. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM
(AJWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44430, at *5-8 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2010) (denying the pre-
vailing party's motion for attorneys' fees as the opposing party's claims regarding a lack of
DMCA eligibility were not "objectively unreasonable").
61. Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1109.
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permits service providers to implement a variety of procedures, but an
implementation is reasonable if, under 'appropriate circumstances,' the
service provider terminates users who repeatedly or blatantly infringe
copyright. '62 However, the court also noted that "[t]o identify and termi-
nate repeat infringers, a service provider need not affirmatively police its
users for evidence of repeat infringement. '63 Instead, "[a] policy is un-
reasonable only if the service provider failed to respond when it had
knowledge of the infringement. '64
These definitions were a central part of the holding in Perfect 10. In
this case, "Perfect 10, the publisher of an adult entertainment magazine
and the owner of [a] subscription website . . . allege[d] that CCBill and
CWIE violated copyright . . . laws by providing [web hosting and paid
subscription] services to websites that posted images stolen from Perfect
10's magazine and website. '65 Perfect 10, along with nonparty celebrities
who had images featured in Perfect 10's venues, sent several notices of
copyright infringement to the defendants' designated agent prior to filing
the lawsuit.66 The defendants claimed that they were protected by the
DMCA safe harbor provisions. 67 The district court agreed, granting the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.68
On appeal, Perfect 10 raised several errors with the trial court's deci-
sion. First, Perfect 10 argued that "there [was] a genuine issue of material
fact whether CCBill and CWIE prevented the implementation of their
policies by failing to keep track of repeatedly infringing webmasters. ''69
The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, refused to classify this as a sub-
stantial failure "to record webmasters associated with allegedly infringing
websites, ''70 and found that the defendants' record of most (but not all)
infringing webmasters "[d]id not raise a triable issue of fact that CCBill
and CWIE did not implement a repeat infringer policy. '71
Here, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the defendants' recordkeeping
from that of the defendants in Ellison v. Robertson,72 a case decided by
the court in 2004, and the Aimster73 litigation.74 In Ellison, the Ninth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to
America Online, Inc. (AOL) on a finding of § 512(i) qualification for
DMCA limitation of liability based on a determination that there were
triable issues of fact on the question of reasonable implementation of an
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1111.
64. Id. at 1113.




69. Id. at 1110.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1111.
72. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2004).
73. See In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
74. See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1110.
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account termination policy.75 In that instance, AOL changed its desig-
nated copyright notice agent's email address and failed to give notice of
the change to the United States Copyright Office for several months, "al-
low[ing] notices of potential copyright infringement to fall into a vacuum
and go unheeded. ' 76 In the Aimster litigation, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's determination that Aimster did not meet the
DMCA threshold requirements of a reasonably implemented account ter-
mination policy under § 512(i).77 In these cases, Aimster's encryption
completely masked the identity of the file-transferring users.78 The Sev-
enth Circuit stressed that, rather than "discourag[ing] repeat infringers of
the plaintiffs' copyrights, Aimster invited them to do so, showed them
how they could do so with ease using its system, and by teaching its users
how to encrypt their unlawful distribution of copyrighted materials dis-
abled itself from doing anything to prevent infringement. ' 79 The Perfect
10 court determined that "[u]nlike Ellison and Aimster, where the
changed email address and the encryption system ensured that no infor-
mation about the repeat infringer was collected, it is undisputed that
CCBill and CWIE recorded most webmasters." 80
In addition to its first assigned error, "Perfect 10 claim[ed] that CCBill
and CWIE unreasonably implemented their repeat infringer policies by
tolerating flagrant and blatant copyright infringement by its users despite
notice of infringement from Perfect 10, notice of infringement from copy-
right holders not a party to this litigation and 'red flags' of copyright in-
fringement." 81 With respect to Perfect 10's individual claimed notice of
infringement, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that
Perfect 10 failed to send takedown notices that substantially complied
with § 512(c)(3). 82 Although the notices identified specific infringing
works, they failed to include the complainant's declaration, which reads
"under penalty of perjury, that he is authorized to represent the copyright
holder, and that he has a good-faith belief that the use is infringing."'83
The court determined that these noncompliant communications were fa-
tal to this assigned error, stressing the important First Amendment impli-
cations of online content takedowns. 84 The court urged that:
This requirement is not superfluous. Accusations of alleged infringe-
ment have drastic consequences: A user could have content re-
moved, or may have his access terminated entirely. If the content
infringes, justice has been done. But if it does not, speech protected
75. See Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1077.
76. Id. at 1080.
77. See Aimster, 334 F.3d at 656.
78. See id. at 655.
79. Id.
80. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBilI LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1110 (9th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in
original).
81. Id. at 1111.
82. See id. at 1111-12.
83. Id. at 1112.
84. See id.
[Vol. 64
A Contractual Deterrence Strategy
under the First Amendment could be removed. We therefore do not
require a service provider to start potentially invasive proceedings if
the complainant is unwilling to state under penalty of perjury that he
is an authorized representative of the copyright owner, and that he
has a good-faith belief that the material is unlicensed. 85
Consequently, the court found that these noncompliant communica-
tions did not raise a genuine issue of material fact of a failure to reasona-
bly implement the defendants' account termination policy.86 In doing so,
the Ninth Circuit stressed that "[t]he DMCA notification procedures
place the burden of policing copyright infringement-identifying the po-
tentially infringing material and adequately documenting infringement-
squarely on the owners of the copyright. '87 Furthermore, in language
that is a precursor to the rationale at the heart of the Viacom decision,
the court clearly "decline[d] to shift a substantial burden from the copy-
right owner to the provider."'88
Building on this line of reasoning, the Ninth Circuit similarly rejected
Perfect 10's argument that red flags in the names of websites that re-
ceived services from the defendants, such as "illegal.net" and "stolence-
lebritypics.com," provided the defendants with "aware[ness] of apparent
infringing activity." 89 The Ninth Circuit stated that it would "not place
the burden of determining whether photographs are actually illegal on a
service provider," and, therefore, affirmed the district court's determina-
tion on this point. 90
Despite the strong position that the court took on most of Perfect 10's
assignments of error, the Ninth Circuit did remand the case to the district
court "for determination of whether CCBill and/or CWIE implemented
its repeat infringer policy in an unreasonable manner with respect to any
copyright holder other than Perfect 10."91 Further, the Ninth Circuit "re-
mand[ed] to the district court to determine whether third-party notices
made CCBill and CWIE aware that it provided services to repeat infring-
ers, and if so, whether they responded appropriately. ' 92 In this instance,
the district court had refused to consider the evidence of the nonparty
celebrities who had images featured in Perfect 10's venues and who had
sent several notices of copyright infringement to the defendants' desig-
nated agent. 93 The Ninth Circuit based its remand on the statutory de-
mands of § 512(i), which "requires an assessment of the service provider's
'policy,' not how the service provider treated a particular copyright
holder."'94 Consequently, the appellate court determined that the evi-
85. Id.
86. See id. at 1113.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. See id. at 1114.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1113.
92. Id. at 1115.




dence of the nonparty notices was relevant to the determination of rea-
sonable implementation of the defendants' repeat infringer account
termination policy. 95
Perfect 10 is an important case for any study of DMCA safe harbor-
related litigation, as it illustrates one of the few judicial interpretations of
the meaning of § 512(i)96 and has been used for the basis of argument in
subsequent § 512(i) cases. Specifically, plaintiffs in other DMCA safe
harbor-related lawsuits have attempted to expand the rationale used by
the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10.97 These plaintiffs have argued that termi-
nation policies do not fall under the auspices of § 512(i) because they do
not bar repeat infringers from reregistering with different contact infor-
mation,98 they do not automatically terminate accounts of users who
upload content that is blocked by a filtering system,99 and they do not
automatically terminate accounts after one instance of infringement.100
Largely, these efforts to invalidate the designation of safe harbor eligibil-
ity based on these types of account termination policies have been
unsuccessful.
For example, in the 2008 Io Group, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc. 101 case,
Veoh, a software provider and website operator of an Internet television
network that allowed users to upload video content, was sued for copy-
right infringement by a copyright holder, 10.102 Veoh asserted in its mo-
tion for summary judgment that it was entitled to DMCA safe harbor
protection. 10 3 Io countered in its own motion for summary judgment that
Veoh did not satisfy the DMCA safe harbor eligibility conditions regard-
ing account termination policies pursuant to § 512(i) because Veoh's pol-
icy did "not prevent repeat infringers from reappearing on Veoh under a
pseudonym and a different email address.' ' 0 4 Essentially, Jo claimed that
because there was no reasonable tracking of infringers, the "repeat in-
fringer policy [was] tantamount to no policy at all."'01 5 The court rejected
Jo's argument, stating that Veoh met the requirements of a reasonable
§ 512(i) policy as defined by the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10 and that
95. See id.
96. See UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., No. CV 07-5744 AHM
(AJWx), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44430, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2010) ("There has not been
a great deal of caselaw interpreting under what circumstances a service provider's termina-
tion policies are 'reasonably implemented' (or what are the 'appropriate circumstances' for
terminating a repeat infringer).").
97. See e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099,1116
(C.D. Cal. 2009); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1103, 1110
(W.D. Wash. 2004).
98. See Corbis, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 1103, 1110 (finding that Amazon met the threshold
requirements of § 512(i) despite the fact that "Amazon's infringement policy has not been
able to prevent certain vendors from reappearing on [its] platform under pseudonyms").
99. See UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.
100. See id. at 1118.
101. Io Grp., Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
102. See id. at 1136-37.
103. See id. at 1135.
104. Id. at 1143-44.
105. Id. at 1144.
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"Veoh does track content that has been identified as infringing and per-
manently blocks that content from ever being uploaded by any user.
10 6
Further, the court discarded Io's proposition that a reasonable § 512(i)
policy would require Veoh "to track users by their actual names or by
Internet Protocol ('IP') addresses, ' a0 7 claiming that this would not be a
"more effective reasonable means of implementation," 10 8 in part, because
IP addresses "do not distinguish between users."10 9 Consequently, the
court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment based on a
finding that Veoh qualified for safe harbor protection 1 0
Veoh was at the center of another case in which its account termination
policy was challenged for falling outside of the scope of § 512(i). In
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., UMG argued that "Veoh's
policy [was] inadequate because it [did] not automatically terminate users
who upload videos that are blocked by the Audible Magic filter." '1 11 This
proprietary filtering system provided technology intended to block the
uploading of copyrighted content. 1 12 The court rejected UMG's argu-
ment, referencing the core of the Perfect 10 decision:
If, under [Perfect 10], a notice by a copyright holder that specific
material is allegedly infringing is not a sufficient basis for terminating
a user because it lacks a sworn declaration that the notifier has a
good-faith belief that the material is unlicensed, then it stands to rea-
son that Audible Magic's automated filter also cannot be a valid
basis. 113
The court supported this proposition with a focus on reliability, noting
Veoh's inability to verify "the accuracy of [third-party] Audible Magic's
database."1 1 4
From there, the court transitioned to the idea of responsibility that is
an undercurrent in all DMCA safe harbor-related litigation, finding that
even if Veoh did have the ability to verify the filter's accuracy, "it would
be unreasonable to place that burden on Veoh." 115 The court grounded
its discussion of verifiability and reliability with a pragmatic recognition
of Veoh's responses to DMCA takedown notices:




110. See id. at 1155.
111. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 1116 (C.D.
Cal. 2009).
112. See id. at 1103; see also Audible Magic Content Identification Services, AUDIBLE
MAGIC, http://audiblemagic.com/products-services/contentsvcs/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)
("Audible Magic's content recognition services ensure copyright compliance, and enable
new ways to monetize music and video on the Internet. Automatically scan user-generated
or user-uploaded media files, identify any copyright owners as well as their usage rules,
categorize and tag the content, associate the content with revenue opportunities and em-
power your online business model.").
113. UMG Recordings, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 1117-18.




[a]s a practical matter, when notice of a user's alleged infringement is
not reliable enough to justify terminating the user's account, a ser-
vice provider's removal of the allegedly infringing material is suffi-
cient evidence of compliance with the DMCA. In this case, when
Veoh received notices of infringement it promptly removed the ma-
terial identified.' 1 6
As a result, the court concluded that Veoh's failure to automatically ter-
minate accounts of users who uploaded content that was blocked by the
Audible Magic filtering system did not mean that its account termination
policy fell outside of the requirements of § 512(i).117
In addition to the filtering technology argument, UMG also raised a
precursive argument to the central § 512(i) claim of the Viacom case.' 18
UMG asserted that Veoh did not comply with the DMCA account termi-
nation policy provisions based on Veoh's choice to not automatically ter-
minate user accounts after one instance of infringement. 19 Specifically,
UMG claimed that Veoh's policy was inadequate because "it does not
necessarily terminate users who upload multiple videos that are identified
in a single DMCA notice.' 20 Veoh's procedure was to send a warning to
a user who was identified in a takedown notice, even if that notice identi-
fied multiple instances of the uploading of infringing content by that
user.121 Veoh "then terminated the user's account if the user subse-
quently uploaded another infringing video."'1 22 The court was uncon-
vinced by UMG's claim that this "two-strikes" policy failed to comply
with the DMCA requirements. 23 Instead, the court found that "nothing
in the statute, legislative history, or case law establish[ed] that such a pol-
icy is not reasonable or appropriate."1 24 The court bolstered its conclu-
sion by reasserting the undefined nature of the term "repeat infringer"
within the statutory scheme of the DMCA and by finding that "Veoh's
policy satisfies Congress's intent that 'those who repeatedly or flagrantly
abuse their access to the Internet through disrespect for the intellectual
property rights of others should know that there is a realistic threat of
losing that access."", 25 Consequently, this case, with its finding of compli-
ance with the DMCA § 512(i) requirements, provides another example of
a court rejecting a plaintiff's attempt to stretch the Perfect 10 rationale.' 26
The progression in this case law demonstrates the growing develop-
ment of the meaning of an adopted, implemented, and publicized reason-
116. Id. at 1117-18.
117. See id. at 1116.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.




123. See id. at 1118.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61 (1998)).
126. See id. at 1116 (finding that Veoh's "policy satisfies [§] 512(i)'s requirements, and
achieves the provision's purpose of deterring infringement").
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able policy for termination of accounts of repeat infringers as a threshold
requirement for DMCA safe harbor eligibility under 17 U.S.C. § 512(i).
Clearly, if an Internet or online service provider fails to designate an
agent for claimed infringement notification or fails to terminate repeat
infringers at all, then that provider will not qualify for DMCA safe harbor
protection. 127 However, this type of clear demarcation is rarely present
in DMCA safe harbor-related litigation. Conversely, in most of the rela-
tively few cases that have examined this issue, the providers have desig-
nated an agent, adopted and implemented an account termination policy,
and, pursuant to that policy, terminated some, but not all, repeat infring-
ers. 128 Such was the case in Viacom. 129
Viacom has thrust the matter of the § 512(i) threshold requirements for
DMCA safe harbor eligibility into the legal limelight, with incredible
stakes weighing in the balance. Given these issues, it is little surprise that
Viacom swiftly announced its intention to appeal the decision. 130 Viacom
filed its notice of appeal on August 11, 2010.131 With such enormous
physical and ideological costs at issue, the course of this appeal will be
monitored by legions of Internet and online service providers, copyright
holders, and Internet users.132 It is unclear how the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit will resolve the matter of YouTube's
DMCA safe harbor status, given the various approaches that have been
taken by the few courts that have addressed this issue. 133 Regardless of
the ultimate decision by the Second Circuit, Internet and online service
providers should do more to address the problem of online copyright in-
fringement conducted by their users than only meet the baseline thresh-
old requirements for DMCA safe harbor eligibility under § 512(i). A
viable strategy to provide deterrence in this area is a contractual one.
127. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-03952
JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85266, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010) (denying a Rule 50
motion for judgment as a matter of law premised on the assertion of DMCA safe harbor
protection where the defendants initially failed to have a designated agent to receive
claimed infringement notices, thereafter designated an agent who admittedly did not un-
derstand the DMCA's requirements under §512(i), and failed to terminate repeat
infringers).
128. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
130. See Michael Fricklas, Viacom Statements: The Court Ruling, VIACOM, http://
news.viacom.com/news[Pages/summaryjudgment.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2011); see also
Andrew M. Harris & Donald Jeffrey, Google's YouTube Didn't Infringe Viacom Copy-
rights, Judge Says, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 24, 2010, 12:04 AM), http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2010-06-24/google-s-youtube-didn-t-infringe-viacom-copyrights-
judge-says.html (discussing Viacom's post-decision email regarding its intent to appeal).
131. See Notice of Appeal at 1, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103).
132. See Gary Slapper, The Battle for Copyright on YouTube; A New York Court Rul-
ing in a Billion-Dollar Battle over Downloading Videos has Worried the Creative Industries,
TIMES (London), July 1, 2010, at 67 (discussing the case's significance for a variety of
stakeholders).
133. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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C. THE NEED FOR INCREASED DETERRENCE OF USER-GENERATED
COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT BY INTERNET AND
ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS
A comprehensive review of all of the DMCA safe harbor-related litiga-
tion in the United States yields relatively few bright line rules, despite the
congressional intention for "greater certainty" that supported the passage
of this legislation. 34 Specifically, what is clear from the decisions that
have interpreted the safe harbor eligibility requirements of 17 U.S.C.
§ 512(i) is this: in order to qualify for this eligibility, a service provider
must "[have] adopted and reasonably implemented, and informs sub-
scribers and account holders of the service provider's system or network
of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances
of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or
network who are repeat infringers. 1 13 5 Although this mere recitation of
the statutory requirements may seem pedantic, it is the singular consis-
tent directive for Internet and online service providers that seek protec-
tion in the DMCA's safe harbor. There is little doubt that these
requirements will gain more context with future judicial decisions and
possible legislative clarification. 136 Indeed, contouring of liability and re-
sponsibility will be helpful in delineating the statutory baseline minimums
for rights and duties of the stakeholders involved in DMCA safe harbor-
related litigation. 137 However, it seems unlikely that this type of refine-
ment of the DMCA will provide the necessary effect to curb the core
harm of copyright infringement. 138
In fact, somewhat ironically, one other aspect of clarity that emerges
from the limited field of decisions that construe the safe harbor eligibility
requirements pursuant to § 512(i) is that the existing remedies for re-
peated infringement, pursuant to the DMCA, are not significant or effec-
134. See S. REP. No. 105-190, at 18 (1998) ("Title II [of the DMCA] preserves strong
incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment. At the same
time, it provides greater certainty to service providers concerning their legal exposure for
infringements that may occur in the course of their activities."); see also H.R. REP. No.
105-551, pt. 2, at 49-50 (1998) (same).
135. 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1) (2006).
136. Again, the original intent of the DMCA was to provide a balanced and clear ap-
proach to the problems of emerging technology that allowed for online copyright infringe-
ment. See, e.g., Assaf Jacob & Zoe Argento, To Cache or Not to Cache-That Is the
Question; P2P "System Caching"-The Copyright Dilemma, 31 WHIrTIER L. REV. 421, 489
(2010) ("The DMCA safe harbor clauses were technology-specific amendments [that] ...
were carefully tailored to balance the interests of users, [Internet Service Providers], and
rights holders."). However, this intent, as expressed in the safe harbor statutory language,
needs further explanation.
137. This need for clarification has been addressed by the courts. See, e.g., CoStar Grp.,
Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 555 (4th Cir. 2004) ("It is clear that Congress intended
the DMCA's safe harbor for ISPs to be a floor, not a ceiling, of protection.").
138. See, e.g., David E. Ashley, Note, The Public As Creator and Infringer. Copyright
Law Applied to the Creators of User-Generated Video Content, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 563, 574-75 (2010) (discussing extensive online copyright infringement
via users despite pending litigation premised on such infringement).
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tive deterrents to stop this infringing conduct. 139 Given the scale of
copyright infringement in the digital medium,140 the anonymity that the
Internet provides, 141 and the ease of setting up new accounts,142 simply
terminating a user's account pursuant to a reasonably implemented
§ 512(i) policy is not a sufficient solution to adequately safeguard the
rights of copyright holders. Further, the alternative remedy of a direct
liability lawsuit against the infringer by the copyright holder proves
equally unsatisfactory in many instances, especially when dealing with
rampant infringement.1 43 These lawsuits are often problematic due to the
veil of secrecy provided by the Internet, which can escalate the violative
behavior.1 44 Additionally, if identity issues of the infringing parties do
not arise, the costs of private litigation may be deemed economically un-
feasible, as many offenders may be unable to pay any judgment for statu-
tory damages entered against them. 145
Consequently, it should be of little surprise that copyright holders are
increasingly pursuing litigation against Internet and online service provid-
ers for user copyright infringement. 146 While direct liability suits against
the perpetrators themselves make little sense given their low potential for
return,1 47 secondary liability lawsuits have a much greater chance for a
139. See Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 MINN. L. REV. 9,
51-53 (2010) (discussing the inadequacy of current controls in curbing user-generated cop-
yright infringement).
140. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringe-
ment Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2004) (citing dramatic
increases in online copyright infringement).
141. See Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accounta-
ble, 14 Sup. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006) (discussing the difficulty in identifying the
parties who perpetrate bad acts via a cybermedium).
142. See Darrow & Ferrera, supra note 52, at 3-6 (discussing the ease in setting up new
user accounts on most websites).
143. See Lemos & Stein, supra note 139, at 52-53 (describing copyright infringement as
"largely undetectable" and asserting that "unscrupulous infringers of copyrighted works"
take advantage of the weaknesses in the judicial system regarding enforcement and "ex-
ploit [this vulnerability] to its fullest by increasing the volume of their illicit activities.").
144. See Mtima, supra note 23, at 632 ("[Tlhere is no right to 'privately' break the law.
Indeed, the fact that certain illegal conduct may be difficult to detect typically mandates
that any pertinent privacy interests be specifically assessed against the possibility that lack
of detection and concomitant legal redress may actually encourage the undesirable
conduct.").
145. See Lynda J. Oswald, International Issues in Secondary Liability for Intellectual
Property Rights Infringement, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 247, 250 (2008) (discussing the "difficulty of
identifying, locating, and suing each individual infringer [in direct liability copyright in-
fringement suits for online behavior] ... because the individual users are often judgment-
proof and lack the financial resources to compensate for their infringement"). But see Levi
Pulkkinen, That "Free Song" Could End up Costing Thousands for Washingtonians Ac-
cused of Theft on the Net. Downloaders Face the Music Recording Industry's Focus Turns
to Hunting Individuals, SEA'rLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 14, 2007, at Al (discussing a
recording industry strategy to sue individuals who have illegally obtained music online and
who cannot afford attorneys as a way to force monetary settlements).
146. See Oswald, supra note 145, at 250 (discussing secondary liability lawsuits pre-
mised on user-generated infringement).
147. See Lemley & Reese, supra note 140, at 1349 ("The high volume of illegal uses,
and the low return to suing any one individual, make it more cost-effective to aim litigation
at targets as far up the chain as possible."); see also Martha Neil, Music Downloader Ap-
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lucrative outcome.1 48 So, while Internet and online service providers may
view compliance with the threshold requirements of § 512(i) as a shield
against DMCA safe harbor-related litigation and judgments for damages
for copyright infringement, 49 the reality is that these defendants who are
hailed into court still have to bear the brunt of a defense-both economi-
cally and reputationally' 50-despite such compliance and even if the ulti-
mate ruling is a favorable one. 151
A pragmatic perspective on these issues suggests that an alternative
remedy would be useful to all stakeholders who are genuinely committed
to reducing copyright infringement.15 2 Although the infringement of
these rights is not tantamount to terrorism,1 53 the preservation of intellec-
tual property rights has been a core part of American history154 and juris-
prudence.1 55 Consequently, more must be done in order to continue to
protect the important rights that copyright law grants to copyright hold-
ers. The DMCA should not be deemed a panacea for this type of In-
ternet-tortious activity.156 Instead, alternative solutions need to be
explored in order to decrease the opportunities for the violation of copy-
right holders' rights in the online medium. Although it is unlikely that a
single strategy can provide a cure-all,1 57 more action needs to be taken by
all of the parties who are involved in DMCA safe harbor-related litiga-
tion in furtherance of this goal of deterrence. In other words, "[c]opying
peals $67.5K Award, Calls It "Equally as Insane" as Earlier $675K Verdict, A.B.A. J. (Aug.
25, 2010, 5:16 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/music downloader-appeals_
67.5k award calls it equally-as-insaneas-earlier_/ (providing that a graduate student
who was sued for unlawfully downloading copyrighted music would be required to file for
bankruptcy if the $67,500 verdict is upheld on appeal).
148. See Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1384 (2010) (pro-
viding that Internet service "providers have deep pockets that greatly increase their vulner-
ability to lawsuits, making them scapegoats for their users' infringing activities").
149. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Awaiting a Compromise on YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2007, at C1 Late Edition (quoting Google's chief executive as stating that "Google respects
copyright" and that it complies with the DMCA).
150. See, e.g., Andrew Morse, Veoh Plans to Liquidate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2010, at
B6 (discussing the decision of Veoh to liquidate under bankruptcy protection due in part to
"[tlhe distraction of the legal battles"). Veoh was acquired by Qlipso in April 2010. See
About Veoh, VEOH, http://www.veoh.com/corporate/aboutus (last visited Mar. 21, 2011).
151. See Nocera, supra note 149, at C1 (implying that certain copyright holders would
like to "litigate YouTube off the face of the earth").
152. See Amanda Bronstad, Hollywood Squares Off Against the Internet in the Second
Circuit, 244 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 2010, at 5 (discussing the perspectives of several amicus
brief filers in Viacom that both Internet service providers and copyright holders should be
involved in deterring online copyright infringement).
153. See MARCUS BOON, IN PRAISE OF COPYING 101 (2010) ("[T]he most aggressive
defenders of copyright law have done their best to link copyright breach to terrorism
154. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (giving Congress the power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and inven-
tors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
155. See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) (framing the
copyright discussion with the Copyright Clause of the United States Constitution).
156. See, e.g., Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he DMCA
did not simply rewrite copyright law for the on-line world.").
157. See Yu, supra note 148, at 1373 (exploring other potentially viable solutions to
curb online copyright infringement via a "graduated response" strategy).
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.. is real enough, and we do not have the luxury of deciding whether we
like it or not. The question ... is how we handle it. ' '158
Due to their control over the cyberforums that are at the center of
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation, Internet and online service provid-
ers are actually in a unique position to help curb online copyright in-
fringement without taking on the responsibility of increased monitoring
beyond what the DMCA requires (or, to this point, has been construed to
require). Further, to take advantage of this position (and explore all of
the available avenues for deterrence) would reflect the professed ideol-
ogy of many of these entities;159 indeed, representatives of Internet and
online service providers have publicly attested to a commitment to the
protection of copyright. 160 For example, YouTube's founders have ex-
plained that "neither they nor YouTube [have] any interest in growing the
company or profiting by virtue of the presence of materials on the service
that infringed others' copyrights.' '1 61
Inarguably, Internet and online service providers already do employ a
variety of methods and considerable resources to stop the use of their
websites as conduits for infringing activity. 162 These methods include
some user education through website guidelines, user verification through
email addresses, and limited duration for content uploading. 163 However,
regardless of these efforts, the frontline mechanism utilized by these enti-
ties as a means to protect copyright holders in accordance with stated
ideology is compliance with the requirements of the DMCA.164 This
baseline minimum approach by service providers regarding deterrence of
online copyright infringement needs conscientious revamping.
The argument advanced in this Article is that such a strategy should be
sought through the utilization of stricter user agreements when persons
want to access and post content to websites. 165 Specifically, this approach
158. BooN, supra note 153, at 234 (citing John Giorno, Everyone Gets Lighter, in SUB-
DUING DEMONS IN AMERICA: SELECTED POEMS, 1962-2007, 352-53 (2008)).
159. See, e.g., How to Report Claims of Intellectual Property Infringement, FACEBOOK,
http://www.facebook.com/legal/copyright.php (last visited Mar. 21, 2011) ("Facebook is
committed to protecting the intellectual property of third parties.").
160. See, e.g., Berlusconi Media Firm Sues Google for Content on YouTube, IRISH
TIMES, July 31, 2008, at 11 (quoting a YouTube spokeswoman as stating "YouTube respects
copyright holders and takes copyright issues very seriously").
161. Declaration of Zahavah Levine at 2, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), (No. 1:07-cv-02103).
162. See id. (describing the millions of dollars and thousands of hours that many You-
Tube employees have expended "to minimize the incidence of unauthorized copyrighted
material on the service, while ensuring that YouTube remained a vibrant platform for users
around the world to share their own videos").
163. See id. at 2-5.
164. See, e.g., id. at 2-11 (providing nineteen paragraphs of explanation on how You-
Tube complies with the provisions of the DMCA as opposed to six paragraphs on user
education); How to Report Claims of Intellectual Property Infringement, supra note 159
(highlighting the DMCA notice and takedown procedures as the remedy for copyright
infringement on the site).
165. Essentially, this strategy consists of an integrated approach to contract and intel-
lectual property law, which has been proposed in other contexts as "intellectual property
rights combine easily with contracts." Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with
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could be accomplished through changes to the model of user agreements
that would require more evidence of users' assent to the agreements and
increased security measures for identity verification. Additionally, this
approach would require the revision of current user agreements to in-
clude remedies for users' infringing conduct that are more stringent than
the existing provisions on termination of user accounts pursuant to the
DMCA. Further, this approach would require actual and open enforce-
ment of the user agreement when there is a breach by a user in posting
infringing content. Finally, these contractual changes and the enforce-
ment of these provisions would need to be reflected in a comprehensive
notice system to increase the transparency of Internet and online service
providers' efforts to curb cyber-harms that are perpetrated via their
services.
The adoption of this approach would be of substantial benefit to all
parties who are affected by online copyright infringement-including In-
ternet and online service providers. 166 Although this proposed strategy
would require a sea change to the standard modes of Internet busi-
nesses, 167 it would be an effective and non-cost-prohibitive way to in-
crease deterrence of online copyright infringement-a stated goal by
many of these entities. 168 Further, service providers could incorporate
the necessary changes in an almost instantaneous manner, given the
breadth of the provisions within most extant user agreements 69 and the
nature of the Internet itself.170 The use of this approach would also help
to transform the public perception that allocates blame to the online and
Internet service providers as being "serial offender[s]" in the perpetration
of digital copyright infringement. 171 Additionally, these good faith ef-
forts could discourage potentially negative behavior on the part of copy-
right holders in stalling to report infringements. 172
Intellectual Property Law: An Interdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 116 (2008-2009).
166. See Bronstad, supra note 152.
167. See, e.g., Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on the High Seas of Legalese:
Law and Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 79, 81 (2008) (dis-
cussing the variance in approaches to user agreements).
168. See supra text accompanying note 159.
169. See, e.g., Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, YouTUBE (June 9,2010), http://
www.youtube.com/t/terms ("YouTube may, in its sole discretion, modify or revise these
Terms of Service and policies at any time, and you agree to be bound by such modifications
or revisions.").
170. See, e.g., Leonard Bucklin, More Preaching, Fewer Rules: A Process for the Corpo-
rate Lawyer's Maintenance of Corporate Ethics, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 887, 943 (2009)
(discussing digital natives and their exposure to "the complexity and swift changes of infor-
mation on the ... [Ijnternet").
171. See, e.g., Google Is 'Serial Offender,' Cleland Tells House Panel, WASH. INTERNET
DAILY, Sept. 17, 2010 (providing coverage of congressional testimony regarding Google
and online copyright infringement).
172. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Distortionary Effect Of Evi-
dence on Primary Behavior, 124 HARV. L. REV. 518, 541 (2010) (discussing how copyright
law can "ha[ve] the obvious side effect of incentivizing intellectual property owners to
generate evidence of continual infringement... [by] sit[ting] idly by and allow[ing] multi-
ple infringements of their rights to occur").
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Finally, Internet and online service providers should explore this alter-
native avenue for deterring online copyright infringement as a way to
protect their own assets-regardless of whether they qualify for DMCA
safe harbor protection. This strategy should be adopted as a way to insu-
late themselves from significant monetary liability in the case that a court
finds noncompliance with § 512(i) provisions. 173 Of course, this strategy
will also be beneficial when companies are in compliance with the
DMCA. Essentially, if these contractual deterrents are an effective
means to curb online copyright infringement (the root harm at issue in
DMCA safe harbor related litigation), then these measures could com-
mensurately curb the number of copyright infringement lawsuits that are
filed against online service providers. 174 Given all of these factors, it is in
the interest of Internet and online service providers to adopt such a prag-
matic approach to reduce the number of claims and lawsuits that will un-
doubtedly continue to be filed by copyright holders as long as the
infringing behavior has an outlet in an electronic forum.
III. DETERRENCE OF USER-GENERATED COPYRIGHT
INFRINGEMENT THROUGH STRENGTHENED
USER AGREEMENTS
If Internet and online service providers are truly invested in the pre-
vention of online copyright infringement, 175 then additional measures are
needed in contract formation, remedies, and enforcement within their
user agreements. 176 Simply implementing a 17 U.S.C. § 512(i) account
termination policy is not a sufficient means to deter infringing conduct. 177
Given the current requirements of most Internet and online service prov-
iders, there is no effective mechanism to stop a terminated account
holder from simply reregistering an account with another email account
173. For example, in a recent federal district court case, the court declined to grant the
defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial after a jury
awarded damages in the amount of $300,000 per defendant for contributory copyright in-
fringement based on the jury finding that the defendants were not entitled to DMCA safe
harbor protection. See Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., No. C 07-
03952 JW, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85266, at *2, *24-25, *53 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2010).
174. The potential reduction in copyright infringement lawsuits against online and In-
ternet service providers is of considerable value, given the developing character of this area
of law. See, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, The Relationship Between the ISP Safe Harbors and
the Ordinary Rules of Copyright Liability, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 427, 443 (2009) (discuss-
ing the effect of the convergence of common law and statutory schemes of copyright in-
fringement upon online service providers).
175. See, e.g., Veoh Copyright Policy, VEOH, http://www.veoh.com/corporate/copyright
(last visited on Mar. 21, 2011) ("Veoh takes copyright and other intellectual property rights
very seriously.").
176. These user agreements may be labeled Terms of Service, Terms of Use, or other
descriptions. See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 167, at 81 (discussing the various terminol-
ogy employed by Internet and online service providers to describe user agreements). For
consistency, the term "user agreements" will be utilized throughout this Part of the Article
to describe the agreements that govern the relationships between Internet and online ser-
vice providers and the users of their services.
177. See Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
253, 270 (2006) (discussing the inadequacies of account termination policies).
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and continuing this pattern of tortious activity.' 78 Further, until the root
harm of online copyright infringement is addressed by service providers,
beyond threshold compliance with the DMCA safe harbor requirements,
these entities will face continued possibilities for protracted litigation, ex-
posing themselves to negative publicity and potential liability.
17 9
The suggested revisions that are addressed in this Part of the Article
would be a step forward in reducing the malignant, infringing conduct by
website users that harms both copyright content owners and service prov-
iders. This Part advocates for a tripartite strategy to strengthen user
agreements as a way to deter online copyright infringement, with reform
needed in the main areas of contract formation, drafting, and enforce-
ment. Specifically, this approach will advocate for (1) increased mecha-
nisms to evidence assent by the user to the user agreement; (2) additional
security measures for identity verification in account creation; (3) clearer
provisions on account termination; (4) the inclusion of liquidated dam-
ages clauses; (5) the open enforcement of current indemnification provi-
sions and other remedial provisions; and (6) increased marketing of these
efforts.
This proposed strategy can be an effective way to help to curb online
copyright infringement, as well as the DMCA safe harbor-related litiga-
tion that is premised on the propagation of this primary infringement. 8 0
Further, it can help ensure the continued viability of lawful content shar-
ing,' 8 ' an important component of the digital marketplace of ideas and
Internet freedom. Finally, it is a strategy that can be quickly adopted and
implemented by Internet and online service providers, given the fluid na-
ture of the Internet.182
The Internet provides the perfect arena for swift changes like those
proposed in this Article. For example, eBay has modified its user agree-
ment to more accurately reflect the nature of the transfer of title pursuant
to Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401(2) and California's codification of
178. See id. ("OSPs ... might also terminate free home page accounts for any number
of reasons, including outsiders' claims of copyright infringement, but little prevents a sub-
scriber so terminated from simply establishing a new free account with the same OSP.").
179. See, e.g., Don Jeffrey, Viacom Appeals YouTube Copyright-Infringement Ruling,
BLOOMBERO (Aug. 11, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-11/
viacom-appeals-youtube-copyright-infringement-rulinghtm (discussing the lengthy time-
line of the case and the drop in share prices for both Google and Viacom).
180. This approach would seemingly satisfy the claim of content holders that the
DMCA is "a law intended to provide safe harbor against liability where online services
providers take reasonable steps to prevent infringement." Viacom Statements: Viacom
Files Brief with U.S. Court of Appeals, VIACOM (Dec. 3, 2010), http://news.viacom.com/
news/Pages/statements-viacom-files-brief.aspx.
181. See, e.g., Brian Heater, Viacom vs. Google: The Battle for You Tube, PCMAG (Mar.
22, 2010), http://www.pcmag.comlarticle2/0,2817,2361617,00.asp (describing how successful
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation on the part of copyright holders may lead to the
demise of lawful content sharing).
182. See Adrian Vermeule, Congress and the Costs of Information: A Response to Jane
Schacter, 89 B.U. L. REV. 677, 687 (2009) ("Internet technology is seemingly more fluid
now than printing technology was in its era.").
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these relevant sections.18 3 Specifically, these provisions provide different
times for passage of title in sales contracts depending upon the nature of
the contract as a place of shipment or place of destination contract. 184
For the former, "title passes to the buyer at the time and place of ship-
ment. ' 185 For the latter, "title passes on tender" at the place of destina-
tion.1 86 However, in the eBay user agreement that became effective on
August 13, 2008, the following language was provided regarding transfer
of title:
We do not transfer legal ownership of items from the seller to the
buyer, and nothing in this agreement shall modify the governing pro-
visions of California Commercial Code § 2401(2) and Uniform Com-
mercial Code § 2-401(2), under which legal ownership of an item is
transferred upon physical delivery of the item to the buyer by the
seller. Unless the buyer and the seller agree otherwise, the buyer
will become the item's lawful owner upon physical receipt of the
item from the seller, in accordance with California Commercial Code
§ 2401(2) and Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401(2). 187
The current eBay user agreement has been modified, with respect to its
discussion of the governing law: "We do not transfer legal ownership of
items from the seller to the buyer. California Commercial Code
§ 2401(2) and Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401(2) applies to the trans-
fer of ownership between the buyer and the seller, unless the buyer and
the seller agree otherwise. 1 88
eBay is not the only online service provider to revise its user agreement
or revamp its account creation process. 189 For example, an Internet
Archive190 search of Veoh, an online service provider that has been the
subject of several DMCA safe harbor-related lawsuits, 191 demonstrated a
183. The eBay user agreement is governed by California law. See Your User Agree-
ment, EBAY (Sept. 7, 2010), http://pages.ebay.com/help/policies/user-agreement.html.
184. See CAL. COM. CODE § 2401(2) (West 2002) ("Unless otherwise explicitly agreed
title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which the seller completes his perform-
ance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods.").
185. Id. § 2402(2)(a).
186. Id. § 2402(2)(b).
187. Your User Agreement, EBAY (Aug. 13, 2008) (on file with author).
188. Your User Agreement, supra note 183.
189. Compare Declaration of Zahavah Levine at Ex. 2, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube,
Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103) (providing copies of the
YouTube user agreements from December 2005 and January 2007), with Terms of Service:
Community Guidelines, supra note 169 (showing some revisions from previous YouTube
user agreements). An Internet Archive search was attempted to locate a screenshot of the
YouTube account creation screen to determine if changes had been made to this process.
However, access to the archived website for YouTube sign-up "has been blocked by the
site owner." See Internet Archive Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://web.
archive.org/web/20050428171556/http://www.youtube.com/signup.php (last visited Jan. 7,
2011).
190. See INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) ("The
Internet Archive, a 501(c)(3) non-profit, is building a digital library of Internet sites and
other cultural artifacts in digital form. Like a paper library, we provide free access to
researchers, historians, scholars, and the general public.").
191. See supra text accompanying notes 101-126.
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much simpler account registration process on January 10, 2008, as op-
posed to its current registration process. 192 In fact, most of the user
agreements utilized by Internet and online service providers expressly in-
corporate change of terms clauses that allow for such modification. 193
This characteristic of the user agreements, coupled with the fluidity of the
Internet, makes the solution advanced in this Article, which requires
changes to contract formation, drafting, and enforcement, viable and eas-
ily accomplishable.
A. CONTRACT FORMATION AND ACCOUNT CREATION
Generally, the websites that provide their users the opportunity to
upload content, which creates the potential for online copyright infringe-
ment, utilize acceptance of user agreements as a part of the account crea-
tion process to govern the relationship between the Internet or online
service provider and the user1 94 In addition to acceptance of the user
agreement, account creation also typically requires the user to provide
basic identification information, such as a first and last name, email ad-
dress, account password, gender, and birthdate. 195 Both of these prongs
of account creation should be the focus of reformation, on the part of
Internet and online service providers, in an effort to curb user-generated
copyright infringement and subsequent DMCA safe harbor-related litiga-
tion. Specifically, they should revise their business practices to include
(1) increased mechanisms to evidence assent to the user agreement by the
user who can post potentially infringing content to the website and (2)
additional security measures for identity verification in account creation.
192. As of January 2011, Veoh's registration process requires a username, email ad-
dress, password, country, gender, and birthdate. See Create a New Veoh Account, VEOH,
http://www.veoh.com/register (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). In January 2008, only a username,
email, and password were required. See Veoh Log-in, VEOH, http://web.archive.org/web/
20071011030836rn_1/www.veoh.com/login.html?redir=1&noAction=1 (last visited Jan. 6,
2011).
193. See, e.g., Craigslist Terms of Use, CRA1GSLIST, http://www.craigslist.org/about/
terms.of.use (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) ("We reserve the right, at our sole discretion, to
change, modify or otherwise alter these terms and conditions at any time. Such modifica-
tions shall become effective immediately upon the posting thereof. You must review this
agreement on a regular basis to keep yourself apprised of any changes. You can find the
most recent version of the TOU at: http://www.craigslist.org/about/terms.of.use.html");
Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, supra note 169 ("Although we may attempt to
notify you when major changes are made to these Terms of Service, you should periodi-
cally review the most up-to-date version http://www.youtube.com/t/terms. YouTube may,
in its sole discretion, modify or revise these Terms of Service and policies at any time, and
you agree to be bound by such modifications or revisions.").
194. See, e.g., Hi! Ready to Register with eBay?, EBAY, https://scgi.eBay.com/ws/eBay
ISAPI.dll?RegisterEnterlnfo (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (requiring acceptance of the user
agreement via a clickable icon to create an account); Get Started with Your Account, You-
TUBE, http://www.youtube.com/create account?feature=idx-promostd&next= (last vis-
ited Jan. 15, 2011) (conditioning account creation on acceptance of the Google Terms of
Service and the YouTube Terms of Use).
195. See, e.g., FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011); Create a
New Veoh Account, supra note 192.
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The user agreements utilized by Internet and online service providers
that are most susceptible to DMCA safe harbor-related litigation are pri-
marily browsewrap and clickwrap agreements. 196 Over the last decade,
the area of jurisprudence involving these user agreements has developed
rapidly.197 Electronic standard form contracts are categorized by the
type of assent that is required by the user of the website. 198 Mutual as-
sent is an essential component of contract formation. 199 Due to the dif-
ferences in the natures of browsewrap and clickwrap agreements, 2z°
courts have found varying levels of valid contract formation and enforce-
ability between these two forms of user agreements.201 Although user
agreements are not treated uniformly by the courts, they share a predom-
inant similarity in that most users never read them.202 This characteristic
is a typical one for standard form contracts, whether they are traditional
196. See Hines v. Overstock.com, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 2d 362, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (pro-
viding that the primary forms for Internet contracting are browsewrap and clickwrap
agreements); see, e.g., MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, MYSPACE (June 25, 2009),
http://www.myspace.com/help/terms (providing an example of a browsewrap and clickwrap
user agreement with the following provisions: "By accessing and/or using the MySpace
Services, you agree to be bound by this Agreement, whether you are a 'Visitor' (which
means that you simply browse the MySpace Services, including, without limitation, through
a mobile or other wireless device, or otherwise use the MySpae Services without being
registered) or you are a 'Member' (which means that you have registered with MySpace).
The term 'User' refers to a Visitor or a Member."). In order to create a MySpace account,
an individual must click a button that is labeled "Sign up free." See Sign up in Less Than
60 Seconds, MYSPACE, https://www.myspace.com/signup (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). Above
this button is the following language: "By clicking Sign up free, you agree to Myspace
terms of service and privacy policy." See id.
197. See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 167, at 82 (stating that in the early 2000s, "the
development of a body of applicable case law [regarding the enforceability of online user
agreements] is in its infancy, with very few published rulings on point before the year 2000,
and the availability of such authorities did not become substantial until around 2003"). See
also Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Survey of the Law of Cyberspace: Elec-
tronic Contracting Cases 2007-2008, 64 Bus. LAW. 199, 218 (2008) (claiming the maturity of
the law of Internet contracts).
198. See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, Electronic Contracting Cases,
2009-2010, 66 Bus. LAW. 175, 176 (2010) (discussing the differences between browsewrap
and clickwrap agreements for standard form electronic contracts).
199. See Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 464-65 (2006) (discuss-
ing the fundamental nature of assent in contracting and how this element gives contracts
legitimacy).
200. Although most courts apply a different analysis for what they deem to be brow-
sewrap and clickwrap agreements, some courts have "recognized that whether terms are
presented as clickwrap terms or browsewrap terms has no bearing on enforceability;
rather, the relevant inquiry is whether the terms were reasonably communicated to the
website user." Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 198, at 178.
201. See generally Woodrow Hartzog, The New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media
Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y 405 (2010) (discussing enforceability
of browsewrap and clickwrap agreements); Mo Zhang, Contractual Choice of Law in Con-
tracts of Adhesion and Party Autonomy, 41 AKRON L. REV. 123, 173 (2008) (discussing
judicial treatment of these agreements).
202. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Slaying the Leather-Winged Demons in the Night: Re-
forming Copyright Owner Contracting with Clickwrap Misuse, 30 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 495,
503 (2004) (stating that it is "common knowledge that the vast majority of individuals do
not, in fact, read the shrinkwrap and clickwrap agreements").
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or online agreements. 20 3
Although browsewrap agreements appear online in many different
forms, they generally bind the user to the agreement based on the mere
use or browsing of the website or online services. 20 4 Consequently, brow-
sewrap agreements do not require any type of express manifestation of
assent to the agreement.205 Instead, assent is premised on use of the web-
site or services alone.206 The terms of browsewrap user agreements are
typically accessible via a hyperlink on the homepage. 20 7 Although some
courts have upheld the formation and enforceability of browsewrap
agreements, 20 8 other courts have refused to do so. 209 Despite the ulti-
mate holding, when faced with the question of formation and enforceabil-
ity of browsewrap agreements, the majority of courts focus on the issue of
notice to the user 21 0-specifically, "whether the website user 'has actual
or constructive knowledge of a site's terms and conditions prior to using
the site.'" 211
Due to the nature of browsewrap agreements, which claim acceptance
of their terms premised on mere use, most websites that allow users to
upload content require the creation of an account via acceptance of a
clickwrap agreement.212 As opposed to browsewrap agreements, click-
203. See Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1307, 1313 (2005) (noting that few people read standard form contracts); Nishanth V.
Chari, Note, Disciplining Standard Form Contract Terms Through Online Information
Flows: An Empirical Study, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1618, 1626 (2010) (stating that "[Law and
Economics] scholars generally agree that most buyers do not read SFCs at the time of
purchase").
204. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Brow-
sewraps can take various forms but basically the website will contain a notice that-by
merely using the services of, obtaining information from, or initiating applications within
the website-the user is agreeing to and is bound by the site's terms of service.").
205. See Sw. Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C., No. 3:06-CV-0891-B, 2007 WL 4823761,
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007) ("A defining feature of a browsewrap license is that it does
not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly-the user need
not sign a document or click on an 'accept' or 'I agree' button.").
206. See id. ("A party instead gives his [or her] assent simply by using the website.").
207. See, e.g., Terms of Use, VEOH (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.veoh.com/corporate/
termsofuse (The following sample of a browsewrap agreement can be accessed by a hyper-
link from the website's main page: "By accessing or using the Veoh Service, you ('You' or
'Your' as applicable) are bound by the notices, terms and conditions in these TOU and, as
applicable, elsewhere on www.veoh.com (including but not limited to our Privacy Policy
and Copyright Policy, which are incorporated by reference).").
208. See, e.g., Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5 (upholding the enforceability of
a browsewrap agreement).
209. See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Comms. Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 31-32 (2d Cir. 2002) (re-
fusing to enforce a browsewrap agreement where the terms of the agreement were only
available on a scroll-down through another screen apart from the screen where a download
was offered via a click of a button).
210. See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 198, at 178-79 (discussing the contractual
idea of notice as the essential inquiry for assent in contract formation in browsewrap en-
forceability cases).
211. Snap-on Bus. Solutions Inc. v. O'Neil & Assocs., Inc., 708 F. Supp. 2d 669, 681
(N.D. Ohio 2010) (quoting Sw. Airlines Co., 2007 WL 4823761, at *5).
212. See, e.g., Create a New Veoh Account, supra note 192 (requiring account creation
via acceptance of a clickwrap agreement, as evidenced by clicking a "Sign up" icon which
demonstrates the user's agreement to the hyperlinked Terms of Service, in order to
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wrap agreements require an express manifestation of assent to the agree-
ment by affirmatively clicking on a box or icon designating such
agreement.213 Some of these clickwrap agreements will feature the user
agreement via a hyperlink next to the clickable icon,214 while others will
feature a scroll-through textbox on the same page as the clickable icon.215
Courts have routinely upheld the formation and enforceability of click-
wrap agreements, 216 including situations involving online and Internet
service providers that allow users to upload content.217
Despite the judicial trend of increasing enforcement of clickwrap
agreements, 218 Internet and online service providers should introduce in-
creased mechanisms to evidence assent to the user agreement by the user
who can post potentially infringing content to the website. In order to
deter online copyright infringement effectively, more is needed from
these entities than baseline compliance with the DMCA or with what has
been upheld as sufficient evidence of assent for a finding of an enforcea-
ble user agreement by past courts. Essentially, more is needed than just a
clickable icon with a hyperlink to the user agreement on the account cre-
ation page219 for Internet and online service providers to truly respect
"upload videos of any run length"). See also Terms of Use, supra note 207 ("Registration is
not required to view most User and Video Content provided as part of the Veoh Service.
However, You are required to register if You wish to post a comment or upload a video,
download the Veoh Client or view certain User Material and Video Content.")
213. See United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 462 n.22 (C.D. Cal. 2009) ("Clickwrap
agreements require a user to affirmatively click a box on the website acknowledging
awareness of an agreement to the terms of service before he or she is allowed to proceed
with further utilization of the website."); Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 198, at 176
(discussing the express manifestation of assent that is tied to clickwrap agreements). See,
e.g., Hi! Ready to Register with eBay?, supra note 194 (requiring users to click a box that
signifies that "I agree that: I accept the User Agreement and Privacy Policy" for account
creation).
214. See id. (featuring hyperlinks to the User Agreement and Privacy Policy, under-
neath the clickable box of acceptance of the agreement).
215. See, e.g., Get Started with Your Account, supra note 194 (providing a scroll-through
textbox of the Google Terms of Service and the YouTube Terms of Use on the same page
as the clickable icon, "I accept" box, as well as hyperlinks in the following language that
precedes the clickable icon: "By clicking 'I accept' below you are agreeing to the YouTube
Terms of Use, Google Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.").
216. See Burcham v. Expedia, Inc., No. 4:07CV1963 CDP, 2009 WL 586513, at *2-3
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2009) (noting that district and circuit courts routinely uphold the en-
forceability of clickwrap agreements and finding that the clickwrap agreement at issue in
the case was enforceable).
217. See, e.g., Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., No. 3:2008-247, 2009 WL 1203365, at *1-5 (W.D.
Pa. May 1, 2009) (enforcing the MySpace clickwrap agreement); Feldman v. Google, Inc.,
513 F. Supp. 2d 229, 235 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding the enforceability of Google's clickwrap
agreement).
218. See Abruzzi, supra note 18, at 112 ("A user's click-through is usually adequate to
establish that the user and the website proprietor formed a 'contract' that incorporates the
terms of use.").
219. See Francis J. Mootz III, After the Battle of the Forms: Commercial Contracting in
the Electronic Age, 4 l/S: J.L. & POL'Y INFO. Soc'y 271, 284 (discussing the favorable treat-





Internet and online service providers have a variety of options that can
be used to implement an approach of increased mechanisms to evidence
assent to user agreements. At a minimum, these providers should incor-
porate a scroll-through textbox that includes the entire user agreement
on the account creation screen with a clickable icon that cannot be
clicked until the user completely scrolls through the entire document.
221
A much better mechanism, which would especially fit with the services
provided by a website that allows users to upload content, would be the
requirement that each user view a video reading, with subtitles, of the
user agreement in its entirety before having the ability to click on an icon
that represents agreement with the terms. To further improve this ap-
proach, user agreements should be revised into plain language-as most
of these agreements are overly lengthy documents, 222 which tends to dis-
courage users from actually reading them.223 In the video presentation,
the copyright provisions of the user agreement should be explained in
clear, direct language. These provisions should include a discussion of the
notice and takedown procedure as it protects the rights of copyright hold-
ers; 2 24 the counter-notification and replacement of removed material pro-
cedure as it protects the rights of the user against abusive takedown
notices and allegations of repeat infringement;225 and the account termi-
nation procedure for repeat infringers as it protects the rights of the In-
ternet and online service providers to be entitled to DMCA safe harbor
status.
226
Additionally, entities that allow users to upload content on their web-
site should implement an actual, or "knowing," 227 assent mechanism to
220. See, e.g., Metacafe: Usage Rules, METACAFE, http://wikicafe.metacafe.com/en/Meta
cafe:UsageRules (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) ("Metacafe respects the intellectual property
rights of others, and requests you to do the same.").
221. Some websites' account creation pages already do feature a scroll-through textbox
with the user agreement contained therein. See, e.g., Get Started with Your Account, supra
note 194.
222. For example, to create a YouTube account, a user must agree to the YouTube
Terms of Use, the YouTube Privacy Policy, the Google Terms of Service, and the YouTube
Community Guidelines. See id. Together, these user agreements and policies are over
10,000 words long. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Apr. 16, 2007), https://www.
google.com/accounts/TOS?Ioc=US&hl=en; Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, supra
note 169; YouTube Community Guidelines, YouTuBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/commu-
nityguidelines (last visited Jan. 15, 2011); YouTube Privacy Policy Notice, YouTuBE
(Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/t/privacy.
223. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective The-
ory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263, 1269-70 (1993)
("[C]onsumers do not read form contracts both because it is unreasonable to do so and
because businesses do not want consumers to read them prior to signing.").
224. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(2), (3) (2006) (providing the DMCA requirements for a
valid notice and takedown procedure).
225. See id. § 512(g) (2006) (providing the DMCA requirements for counternotification
and replacement of removed materials).
226. See id. § 512(i) (2006) (providing the DMCA requirements for a valid account ter-
mination policy for repeat infringers).
227. See Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The Case for Using "Know-
ing Assent" As the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard Form Con-
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demonstrate explicit agreement with the copyright provisions within the
user agreement (through the incorporation of an "I agree" clickable icon
or an "I do not agree" clickable icon for the specific provisions dealing
with intellectual property). 228 Finally, Internet and online service provid-
ers should require users to answer a short series of questions regarding
the user agreement correctly prior to the conclusion of account creation
in order to evidence awareness and understanding of the contract that is
being formed.
The incorporation of these types of mechanisms would bolster a show-
ing of manifestation of assent to the user agreement (and specifically to
the copyright provisions contained within it). As such, it would demon-
strate the willingness of Internet and online service providers to take
proactive steps towards the deterrence of online copyright infringe-
ment-steps above the floor of requirements for assent that most courts
now find.229 Additionally, it would streamline the process of clickwrap
agreement formation by providing the most basic terms in a consumer-
friendly presentation. 230 Further, it would provide a solid foundation to
refute any type of assertion of inadvertent or mistaken clicking on the
part of the user.2 31 The mechanisms also would provide evidence of user
culpability when that user chooses to violate the user agreement by post-
ing infringing content after being required to respond to these increased
assent measures in account creation. Essentially these mechanisms, if
adopted, would concretely demonstrate how the copyright provisions
were bargained-for sections of the user agreement. 232
tracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 473 (2008) ("Knowing assent requires the following: (1)
that the unbargained-for term be conspicuous; (2) that the importance of that term be
explained so that the adhering party understands its significance; and (3) that the adhering
party objectively manifests its assent to that term separately from its manifestation of as-
sent to undertaking a contractual obligation.").
228. See Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 803 (2007) (advocat-
ing for actual assent for specific provisions in software licensing agreements).
229. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 199, at 465 ("But in today's electronic environment,
the requirement of assent has withered away to the point where a majority of courts now
reject any requirement that a party take any action at all demonstrating agreement to or
even awareness of terms in order to be bound by those terms.").
230. See Kim, supra note 228, at 829-30 ("Contract drafters faced with the requirement
of calling out affirmative obligation provisions will either modify their contracts if the pro-
vision is considered important enough (i.e., if it is part of what is being bargained for), or
they will drop the provision as unnecessary, thus streamlining and facilitating the con-
tracting process .... Currently, the overwhelming verbiage presented in form agreements
makes it difficult to distinguish innocuous provisions from those requiring more scrutiny
and contemplation.").
231. See Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 167, at 116 (discussing the possibility that "com-
puter users may have indicated their assent, or acceptance of particular terms, by inadver-
tence, such as by a premature click on a form submission button").
232. See Kim, supra note 228, at 830 ("A requirement of manifestation of consent to an
affirmative obligation term attracts the consumer's attention and requires the consumer to
consider whether the proposed transaction in fact is what she or he had bargained for ....
The consumer faced with such a decision may not be enthusiastic about the available op-
tions, but at least he or she is made aware of the consequences of engaging in the transac-




In addition to adopting these revised systems to evidence user assent,
Internet and online service providers should implement additional secur-
ity measures for identity verification in account creation. Although some
of these providers require the provision of detailed information in the
account creation process, 233 others still only require minimal information,
like a username, password, and email address, to create an account.234
Because of the vast differences in the requirements of email account crea-
tion2 35 and because of the availability of public computers in the United
States that would not tie users to a specific IP address,236 Internet and
online service providers that require only minimal information will have
few or no means to identify the user who chooses to infringe upon others'
intellectual property rights.
In order for strengthened user agreements to effectively deter online
copyright infringement, these entities should implement additional secur-
ity measures for identity verification in account creation. Like the
needed reforms regarding user assent, these changes are not a require-
ment in order to claim safe harbor under the DMCA.2 37 Indeed, the sub-
poena provisions of the DMCA regarding the responsibilities of Internet
and online service providers to respond to subpoenas to identify infring-
ers illustrate this very notion.238 However, improving identity verifica-
tion is a vital part of the strategy for service providers to take proactive
233. See, e.g., Hi! Ready to Register with eBay, supra note 194 (requiring a name, street
address, telephone number, email address, date of birth, user name, password, and entry of
a verification code, as well as acceptance of the user agreement via clickable icon, in order
to create an account).
234. See, e.g., Sign up for a Personal Account, VIDDLER, http://www.viddler.comlsignup/
personal/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (requiring a username, password, and email address,
along with acceptance of the user agreement via clickable icon, to create an account that
allows a user to upload video content to the website).
235. Compare Create an Account, GMAIL, https://www.google.com/accounts/NewAc-
count?service=mail&continue=http://mail.google.com/mail/e-11-lc5fae25d43bfl2b3ad7503
13d8e96-8eada2b39a294aae9eOl82c56e3d42cbfbc7e9cS&type=2 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)
(requiring a full name, username, password, optional alternate email address, country loca-
tion, birthday, word verification, and acceptance of terms of service via clickable icon to
create an account), with New Secure Email Account, HUSHMAIL, https://www.hushmail.
com/signup/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (requiring only the requested email address, pass-
word, number verification, and acceptance of the user and security agreements via click-
able icons to create an account).
236. Courts in DMCA safe harbor-related lawsuits have rejected the idea that an IP
address will always provide a valid identification of an infringing user. See, e.g., lo Grp.,
Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2008) ("There is no
material dispute that, while IP addresses identify a particular computer connected to the
Internet, they do not distinguish between users (e.g., family members) who may share the
same computer.").
237. See id. (finding that "tracking (or verifying) users' actual identity or ... blocking
their IP addresses" is not a requirement of a § 512(i) account termination policy under the
DMCA).
238. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(h)(3) (2006) ("The subpoena [to identify the infringer] shall
authorize and order the service provider receiving the notification and the subpoena to
expeditiously disclose to the copyright owner or person authorized by the copyright owner
information sufficient to identify the alleged infringer of the material described in the noti-
fication to the extent such information is available to the service provider.").
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steps to deter user-generated copyright infringement and subsequent
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation.
A continuum of possibilities is present with respect to additional secur-
ity measures for identity verification. As a baseline minimum, Internet
and online service providers should require users to provide a full name,
physical address, email address, date of birth, user name, password, and
entry of a verification code (in addition to the increased assent accept-
ance of the user agreement) in order to create an account that allows
uploading user content. 239 In order to curb the use of their services by
individuals who provide false information, providers should also require
the user to respond online to a physical mailing that contains a security
code, thereby making the early period of account creation conditional
upon this response. During this time, users should not have the ability to
upload content. This would be a precautionary measure to aid in identity
verification for the purposes of copyright infringement deterrence.
Alternatively, Internet and online service providers should consider the
implementation of an account creation requirement of a verified credit
card or PayPal account that is linked to a bank account for those users
who wish to have the ability to upload content.2 40 This would allow for
the introduction of a sliding-scale-tiered system, which would remain free
for most users but require more identity verification measures for those
users who want more access. Such a mechanism would help to balance
the important ideals of Internet freedom and access241 with the protec-
tion of intellectual property by taking away the veil of anonymity that
currently protects many infringing users.242
Admittedly, some of the suggested reform mechanisms with respect to
identity verification will require more effort and expenditure by these
239. A few providers require this level of detail. See supra text accompanying note 233.
However, most providers do not require this amount of information in order to create an
account. See, e.g., Create Your Metacafe Account, METACAFE, https://secure.metacafe.com/
account/login/?token=a289bObO9985bO347aleca8bcaa3cbb7&action=register (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011) (requiring an email address, nickname, password, birthdate, postal code, and
acceptance of user agreement via clickable icon to create an account).
240. Multiple state officials have requested that Internet and online service providers
require this type of information as part of the account registration process in an effort to
protect minors from unlawful conduct that results from online use. See, e.g., Notice of
Removal, Tab F, Exs. B & D, Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2008)
(No. 4:08-CV-00140) (providing letters from the Ohio and Texas Attorney Generals re-
questing that MySpace and other online service providers require the entry of a verifiable
credit card or bank account information in order to set up accounts as an effort to prevent
the abuse and exploitation of minors).
241. See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 851-53 (1997) (discussing the
vast advantages of Internet access).
242. Interestingly, a review of the user agreements and policies of certain online service
providers reveals that at least one of these entities may be considering the implementation
of such measures. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, MYSPACE (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.myspace.
com/Help/Privacy (discussing how MySpace, which does not currently require credit card
information for account creation, can use personal information, including credit card infor-
mation, obtained during the registration process).
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providers.243 However, many technology experts are already calling for
these types of redesigns.244 By taking these proactive steps, Internet and
online service providers can demonstrate their ability to innovate in the
competitive marketplace. Indeed, making voluntary changes to the ex-
isting business model for formation of most user agreements (as opposed
to a court-ordered or case-driven change) will require a significant shift in
the practices of most Internet and online service providers. 245 This is es-
pecially the case given that most courts find user assent to, and valid for-
mation of, clickwrap agreements 246 despite the fact that most users do not
read them.247 However, if industry leaders voluntarily incorporate these
changes, then it is likely that other entities that are prone to DMCA safe
harbor-related litigation will follow suit.2 48 Because the Internet allows
for such swift changes, modifying user agreement and identity verification
policies would be a cost-efficient and relatively easy reformation to the
account creation and contract formation processes between Internet and
online service providers and their users.
Consequently, Internet and online service providers should make
strides towards a more uniform approach to account creation and con-
tract formation for those users who have the ability to upload content to
their websites.249 Just as threshold compliance with the DMCA is not
enough to provide a significant deterrent to online copyright infringe-
243. Of course, all of these measures would be unnecessary if use of the Internet re-
quired registration with an independent identity verification service. See Scott Ness, The
Anonymous Poster: How to Protect Internet Users' Privacy and Prevent Abuse, 2010 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 8, 52-56 (2010) (advocating for the creation of a mandatory, independent
identity verification system for Internet use). However, the creation of such an innovation
seems to be unlikely in the near future.
244. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 706 (2010) (discussing how lead-
ing technologists are advocating for the redesign of the Internet to improve security and
identity verification).
245. See, e.g., David F. Scranton, "Clickwrap" or "Browsewrap": Enforceable Website
Agreements, 119 BANKING L.J. 290, 291 (2002) (advocating, after a court refused to enforce
a browsewrap agreement, that "financial institutions should [promptly reevaluate] their
Web sites to be sure that any terms, conditions or agreements that are intended to be
binding upon a visitor are implemented with a 'click-through' type mechanism to verify
that the visitor is aware of them and agrees to them").
246. See Hartzog, supra note 201, at 433 (describing courts as "almost uniformly en-
forc[ing] clickwrap agreements" as validly formed contracts).
247. See Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online Contract? Les-
sons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC's Action Against Sears, 8 Nw. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 1, 33 (2009) (stating that judicial decisions on clickwrap agreements typically
"[echo] the long-held acknowledgement that consumers generally do not read form con-
tracts, yet are still bound to the terms of the agreement").
248. See Chari, supra note 203, at 1619-20 (providing this summary of the dominant
position of Law and Economics scholars: "'To what extent will firms include the most
onerous possible clauses [in standard form contracts]?' Scholarly responses to this question
have taken various shapes, but the dominant position today is . .. 'Only so far as competi-
tive pressures fail to discipline firms into offering fair and efficient clauses."').
249. Most reviews of user agreements denote significant differences and a general lack
of uniformity. See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Sense and Nonsense of Web Site Terms of Use
Agreements, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 499, 501-02 (2003) (discussing the differences between
user agreements).
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ment,250 Internet and online service providers' current practice of meet-
ing the minimum requirements for formation and enforceability of their
clickwrap agreements does not sufficiently address the problem of users
misusing these services to infringe upon the intellectual property rights of
others. Implementing increased mechanisms to evidence user assent,
along with additional security measures to verify the identity of users in
the account creation process, will reaffirm the good faith of Internet and
online service providers and their commitment to the protection of copy-
right. Further, this reformation in contract formation is a necessary pre-
requisite for the remaining two prongs of the strategy advanced in this
Article, which include revisions to the practices of contract drafting and
enforcement. Together, these three prongs carry the potential to de-
crease online copyright infringement, which would commensurately curb
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation.
B. CONTRACT DRAF1TING: DMCA ACCOUNT TERMINATION POLICIES
AND OTHER REMEDIAL PROVISIONS IN USER AGREEMENTS
The suggested revisions for modification in the formation of user
agreements are steps in the right direction for Internet and online service
providers who want to show a good faith effort towards minimizing on-
line copyright infringement. However, these entities should also examine
their current drafting practices for these types of contracts and should
consider making revisions to these practices to combat illegal conduct.
Changes to the drafting process, specifically through the use of clearer
provisions on account termination for infringing activity and through the
inclusion of liquidated damages clauses, are an important part of an inte-
grated strategy that service providers should use to stop the tortious ac-
tivity that may take place through their forums (as well as limiting the
type of litigation and negative publicity that is premised upon this type of
activity). The success of these changes depends upon an adherence to the
plain language approach that was mentioned in Part III.A of this Arti-
cle.251 With the increased mechanisms for assent and identity verification
in place, these revised drafting provisions will be much more effective
when enforced by the providers.
Most user agreements currently employ language regarding account
termination that is reflective of the DMCA's requirements for such poli-
cies.252 Unfortunately, many of the key terms of § 512(i) are not defined,
250. See Bridy, supra note 22, at 83 (discussing how past efforts to curb online copyright
infringement have not "made much of a dent" in the tortious behavior).
251. See supra Part III.A.
252. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(i)(1)(A) (2006) ("The limitations on liability established
by this section shall apply to a service provider only if the service provider has adopted and
reasonably implemented, and informs subscribers and account holders of the service pro-
vider's system or network of, a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider's system or net-
work who are repeat infringers."), with Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,
FACEBOOK (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.facebook.com/terms.php?ref=pf ("If you repeatedly
infringe other people's intellectual property rights, we will disable your account when ap-
2011]
SMU LAW REVIEW
and without these definitions there is almost no clear statutory direction
regarding the requirements of these account termination policies.253 Fur-
ther, the litigation that has involved the DMCA account termination poli-
cies has not provided much more clarity beyond the fact that
implementation of such a policy is a threshold condition for safe harbor
status.2 54 As a result, most Internet and online service providers incorpo-
rate a broad, generalized provision regarding account termination that
does not fully encapsulate the providers' practices in enforcing such
policies.
For example, during the Viacom case it was revealed that YouTube uti-
lized a "three-strikes" policy, premised on YouTube's warnings that the
user had uploaded infringing material that was initiated by DMCA take-
down notices, in the enforcement of its repeat infringer account termina-
tion policy.2 55 The court determined that this policy, which counted "as
only one strike against a user both (1) a single DMCA take-down notice
identifying multiple videos uploaded by the user, and (2) multiple take-
down notices identifying videos uploaded by the user received by You-
Tube within a two-hour period, '256 qualified as a "reasonably imple-
mented" policy that allowed YouTube safe harbor eligibility.2 57
However, this level of detail regarding actual policy enforcement is visi-
bly missing in the drafted provisions of the user agreement, which pro-
vide only that "YouTube will terminate a user's access to the Service if,
under appropriate circumstances, the user is determined to be a repeat
infringer." 258
Although not required by the DMCA,2 59 more detailed specificity in
drafting the account termination policies within user agreements would
significantly benefit users, as it would provide an actual notice of the trig-
gers for account termination that is currently missing in most user agree-
ments. Educating users in this way can prospectively stop users from
posting infringing content without the awareness that it is infringing-a
goal that some Internet and online service providers have already pub-
licly articulated.2 60 Further, it would demonstrate the service providers'
transparency of operation, which would be of significant benefit to dis-
prove wrongdoing in a DMCA safe harbor-related lawsuit. Although In-
propriate.") and Vimeo Terms of Service, VIMEO (Jan. 7, 2011), http://vimeo.com/terms
("VIMEO may, in appropriate circumstances and at its discretion, terminate the accounts
of users who infringe the intellectual property rights of others.").
253. See supra text accompanying notes 55-59.
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. See Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
256. Id. at 527-28.
257. See id. at 528.
258. Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, supra note 169.
259. See, e.g., Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1102 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (finding that a service provider need not reveal its internal "decision-making
criteria to the user" in order to have a valid § 512(i) policy).
260. See, e.g., Declaration of Zahavah Levine at 2, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 2d 514 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103) ("A key component of YouTube's
approach to protecting copyright holders is to educate its users.").
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ternet and online service providers may hesitate to increase the
transparency of their operations in an environment of uncertainty regard-
ing future holdings on the reasonableness of § 512(i) policies, these
norms will likely soon be established by judicial arbiters. 261 Once these
norms are established in a user agreement's operative jurisdiction, there
will be little reason to sustain the current practice of broad generalities as
to account termination if the providers are truly invested in the deter-
rence of online copyright infringement.
This increased transparency could also be accomplished via revisions to
the other relevant DMCA remedial provisions within these user agree-
ments. Specifically, Internet and online service providers can clarify the
account termination policy if the DMCA notice and takedown proce-
dures, as well as the counter-notification and put-back provisions, are
stated clearly and with sufficient detail.262 Further, these entities should
monitor the pending Lenz v. Universal Music Corp. case to determine if
they should draft user agreement language to specifically reflect the re-
quirement that a copyright owner must first determine if the use of copy-
righted work is fair use before filing a DMCA takedown notice. 263 The
inclusion of such language would assist in providing a balance for the
rights of all stakeholders within these types of intellectual property dis-
putes and would assist in the deterrence of abusive takedown notices.
The impetus to reform DMCA account termination and other related
provisions in user agreements requires the internal motivation of Internet
and online service providers to be proactive in stopping illegal conduct.
Like contract formation mechanisms, these service providers should im-
plement stronger account termination provisions than what are required
for baseline compliance with the DMCA in order to actively deter copy-
right infringement. By reforming these provisions, Internet and online
service providers can provide a clear warning to the user who might con-
template this tortious activity and can provide evidence of their good
faith efforts to prevent these actions from occurring.
Further, all of these providers should contemplate the inclusion of liq-
uidated damages clauses within their user agreements as a remedy for a
breach, such as use of a website or Internet service to post infringing con-
tent. Currently, most Internet and online service providers have indem-
nification provisions for the losses that might result due to a breach of the
261. The impending decision in the Viacom case will set a significant precedent in es-
tablishing these norms. See Fricklas, supra note 130 (noting that the case provides the
parties with an accelerated timeframe to have appellate courts resolve the issues related to
the applicability of DMCA safe harbor eligibility).
262. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(c)(2), (3) (2006) (providing the DMCA requirements for a
valid notice and takedown procedure); id. § 512(g) (2006) (providing the DMCA require-
ments for counter-notification and replacement of removed materials).
263. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
("[I]n order for a copyright owner to proceed under the DMCA with 'a good faith belief
that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright




user agreement;264 yet only relatively few provide for the collection of
liquidated damages. 265 The uniform drafting of reasonable liquidated
damages clauses for user copyright infringement, premised on an adjudi-
cation of infringement or knowledge of actual infringement,266 could pro-
vide a viable means to deter this type of user conduct. Given the high
stakes of secondary infringement litigation and the insolvency of many
users, it seems unlikely that an Internet or online service provider would
be fully indemnified by a user who breached the agreement in a way that
generated the subsequent DMCA safe harbor-related litigation. How-
ever, such an entity may be able to recover a reasonable amount of liqui-
dated damages from such a breaching user.267 This type of small-but
actual268-recovery could have an equally actual deterrent effect on digi-
tal copyright infringement.
If Internet and online service providers adopt these proposed changes
and institute drafting practices that are reflective of these suggestions,
these entities must ensure that the end result reflects plain language that
is accessible to the user. The efficacy in enforcement of these provisions
will decrease if they are couched in "convoluted legalese. ' 269 The
strength of these contractual requirements can only be fully realized if the
typical consumer user can understand the language after having actually
read it or been exposed to it via the suggested revisions for contract for-
264. See, e.g., Facebook Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 252 ("If
anyone brings a claim against us related to your actions, content or information on
Facebook, you will indemnify and hold us harmless from and against all damages, losses,
and expenses of any kind (including reasonable legal fees and costs) related to such
claim."); Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, supra note 169 ("To the extent permit-
ted by applicable law, you agree to defend, indemnify and hold harmless YouTube, its
parent corporation, officers, directors, employees and agents, from and against any and all
claims, damages, obligations, losses, liabilities, costs or debt, and expenses (including but
not limited to attorney's fees) arising from: (i) your use of and access to the Service; (ii)
your violation of any term of these Terms of Service; (iii) your violation of any third party
right, including without limitation any copyright, property, or privacy right; or (iv) any
claim that your Content caused damage to a third party. This defense and indemnification
obligation will survive these Terms of Service and your use of the Service.").
265. See, e.g., Craigslist Terms of Use, supra note 193 (providing a tiered structure of
liquidated damages (ranging from $25 to $3,000) for various types of breach of the user
agreement); Vimeo Terms of Service, supra note 252 (providing for the collection of liqui-
dated damages, if actual damages cannot be established, for the use of the service to dis-
tribute unsolicited bulk email).
266. This is the standard advanced by Professor Nimmer as a definition for "repeat
infringer" under the DMCA. See 3 MELVILLE NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 12B.10(B)(3) (Matthew Bender ed., 2010).
267. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Measuring "Actual Harm" for the Purpose of Determin-
ing the Enforceability of Liquidated Damages Clauses, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1579, 1579-80
(2005) ("A contractual provision stipulating a sum of money to be paid as damages in the
event of breach will be enforced as a valid liquidated damages clause in most U.S. jurisdic-
tions if, among other minimal requirements that are usually satisfied, it sets forth an
amount that is 'reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the
breach."').
268. Courts have enforced liquidated damages clauses pursuant to breaches of user
agreements. See infra text accompanying notes 274-76.
269. Tasker & Pakcyk, supra note 167, at 144-45 ("A very large percentage of contracts
found on the Internet contain convoluted legalese and long, compound sentence structures
that are difficult to comprehend, even for experienced judges or counsel.").
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mation. With these conditions in place, courts will be more likely to en-
force them. 270 Consequently, the use of plain language throughout the
entirety of the user agreement is an essential part of an effective adoption
of the strategy advanced in this Article. 271 This idea connects all of the
proposed changes to contract formation, drafting, and enforcement
together.
C. THE OPEN ENFORCEMENT OF CONTRACTUAL PROVISIONS
IN USER AGREEMENTS
In addition to the implementation of revisions to the contract forma-
tion and drafting processes, open enforcement of indemnification and
other remedial provisions, as well as increased marketing of these efforts,
by Internet and online service providers will be necessary to complete an
integrated copyright infringement deterrence strategy. Although these
entities may be somewhat reticent to enforce their user agreements, 272
especially in the area of intellectual property disputes, 273 this is an essen-
tial component of prospective dissuasion of online copyright infringement
and DMCA safe harbor-related litigation. Further, the implementation
of the suggested changes to contract formation and drafting will likely
help these providers in seeking assistance from courts in enforcement of
the user agreements.
Courts have enforced user agreements' remedial provisions-specifi-
cally in the form of liquidated damages. 274 Several of these decisions
270. See id. at 143 ("Attorneys, while drafting extreme Internet agreements to zealously
advocate protection for their clients, may have collectively and unintentionally created a
catalyst for an upcoming backlash of unfavorable law from the courts and legislative
bodies.").
271. Some Internet and online service providers have attempted to transform their user
agreements into contracts that are readable and understandable by its users, but this needs
to become a uniform and integrated practice. See, e.g., Vimeo Terms of Service, supra note
252 (providing sideline "Vimeo-speak" explanations as a guide to the terms of service, but
noting that "While we've endeavored to make these Terms of Service easier to read and
understand by providing the 'Vimeo-speak' explanations, please note that it is the 'Lawyer-
speak' section that comprises the actual, legally-binding Terms of Service. As such, the
'Vimeo-speak' section should be seen as a guide or overview only.").
272. See Abruzzi, supra note 18, at 137-38 ("Unlike digital rights management and
copy-protection technologies, which automatically lock down content to prevent privileged
and lawful reproduction and further dissemination of content, TOU require attentive po-
licing, and they admit the possibility that a site owner will exercise its judgment and con-
clude that a certain use is or ought to be tolerated. And indeed, to this point the law
reporters have recorded very few instances in which content purveyors have litigated to
hold users to the terms of website TOU.").
273. See, e.g., BuzzMedia Copyright & Intellectual Property Policy, BUZZMEDIA (Apr.
2010), http://www.buzz-media.com/copyright/ ("Claimants and users must understand that
we are not an intellectual property tribunal. While we and our Designated Copyright
Agent may in our discretion use the information provided in order to decide how to re-
spond to infringement claims, we are not responsible for determining the merits of such
claims.").
274. See Craigslist, Inc. v. Naturemarket, Inc., 694 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1064-65 (N.D. Cal.
2010) (awarding Craigslist liquidated damages for the breach of its user agreement); MyS-
pace, Inc. v. TheGlobe.com, Inc., No. CV 06-3391-RGK (JCx), 2007 WL 1686966, at *10
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2007) (awarding liquidated damages for the distribution of unsolicited
email via the forum in violation of the user agreement).
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have involved Internet or online service providers that are most prone to
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation, such as Craigslist 275 and MyS-
pace. 276 Given this emerging precedent, these entities should vigorously
pursue the recovery of liquidated damages for the breach of their user
agreements in the form of digital copyright infringement. If an Internet
or online service provider has implemented the requirement of a credit
card or PayPal account as an identity verification measure in the contract
formation process,277 then this will assist in the collection of these dam-
ages after adjudication.
Although the judicial trend is to find valid formation and enforceability
of clickwrap user agreements,2 78 a few courts have refused to enforce cer-
tain provisions in these user agreements against consumers under the the-
ory of unconscionability.279 These provisions include arbitration
provisions 280 and choice of forum clauses. 281 Some courts have also ex-
pressed unease with respect to change of terms clauses.282 However, sig-
nificant examples exist of contrary holdings that reject the proposition
that user agreement clauses are unconscionable and therefore unenforce-
able.2 83 These latter cases appear to represent the future of enforcement
of the types of online user agreements that govern the relationship be-
tween an Internet and online service provider and a user who can upload
275. See Craigslist, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 1064-65.
276. See MySpace, 2007 WL 1686966, at *10.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 240-42.
278. See Abruzzi, supra note 18, at 115 ("As time passes and more sites adopt this
convention [of clickwrap and browsewrap agreements], and the links subsist on these sites
for a longer time, a user's argument that he or she did not know where to find the term will
become less supportable. What a court rules, on balance, to be 'sufficiently conspicuous'
today may not even require the balancing tomorrow. If the history of shrinkwrap agree-
ments is any guide, browsewrap [and clickwrap] TOU will overcome the skepticism of
courts by sheer persistence: it is far safer, jurisprudentially, to ratify widespread business
practices than to invalidate them.").
279. See Lemley, supra note 199, at 462-63 (discussing the trends regarding enforceabil-
ity of clickwrap agreements).
280. See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2007)
(finding that the arbitration clause in the clickwrap user agreement for Second Life, an
online virtual world, is procedurally and substantively unconscionable and refusing to en-
force it against a consumer user of the website).
281. See, e.g., Comb v. PayPal, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (con-
cluding that the PayPal user agreement, including the arbitration clause and choice of fo-
rum clause, is substantively unconscionable and refusing to enforce the agreement against
a consumer). See generally J. Brian Beckham, Forum Selection Clauses in Clickwrap
Agreements, 14 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 151 (2006) (discussing cases that found en-
forceability and lack of enforceability of forum selection clauses in clickwrap agreements).
282. See, e.g., Universal Grading Serv. v. eBay, Inc., No. 08-CV-3557 (CPS), 2009 WL
2029796, at *9 n.8 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2009) (declining to determine if a subsequent unilat-
eral modification to the user agreement, pursuant to a change of terms clause, properly
superseded an earlier version of the user agreement based on a finding that the earlier
version contained the same clause at issue).
283. See Tricome v. eBay, Inc., No. 09-2492, 2009 WL 3365873, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 19,
2009) (finding that the eBay "forum selection clause is not substantively unconscionable
because it is not so unduly one-sided so as to shock the conscience"); Harold H. Huggins
Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 696, 708 (D. Md. 2008) (finding the validity of a
unilateral modification of a user agreement pursuant to a change of terms clause, which
resulted in the superseding of a prior agreement).
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content to the service.284
Given this movement toward enforcement of clickwrap user agree-
ments, as well as the examples of enforcement of liquidated damages
clauses for other breaches, Internet and online service providers should
seek judicial support for the enforcement of the provisions suggested in
Part III.B of this Article. 285 However, these providers also need to shoul-
der certain responsibilities in marketing these efforts by giving both pro-
spective and retrospective notice to their users. Publicizing these policies
and their enforcement is an essential part of the strategy to deter digital
copyright infringement. 286
With respect to prospective notice of intentions to enforce their agree-
ments, Internet and online service providers should first provide notifica-
tion whenever they institute revisions to the user agreement. Currently,
many Internet and online service providers assert that users are bound to
the most current user agreement, as posted on the providers' websites,
regardless of the nature of the agreement at the time of the original ac-
count creation and contract formation.287 Although at least one court has
found that a user is bound by a subsequently posted user agreement when
the original contract provided that continued use after some notice of the
change in provisions constituted agreement with the revised user agree-
ment,288 an email notification of all revisions to the user agreement would
be another proactive step to deter online copyright infringement and to
shield providers against lawsuits that stem from such tortious conduct.
This notification should not consist only of cursory notice of the revi-
sions,289 but it should present these changes in the forms recommended
284. See supra text accompanying note 283.
285. See supra Part III.B.
286. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 266, at § 12B.10(f) (discussing how Internet
and online service providers should publicize DMCA account termination policies).
287. See, e.g., Terms of Service: Community Guidelines, supra note 169 ("Although we
may attempt to notify you when major changes are made to these Terms of Service, you
should periodically review the most up-to-date version http://www.youtube.com/t/terms.
YouTube may, in its sole discretion, modify or revise these Terms of Service and policies at
any time, and you agree to be bound by such modifications or revisions."); Terms of Use,
supra note 207 ("Veoh shall have the right to modify these TOU at any time, which modifi-
cation shall be effective upon posting the new TOU on the Terms of Use page of the Veoh
Website. We recommend that You check the Veoh website regularly for any such changes.
Your use of the Veoh Service following such posting shall be deemed to constitute Your
acceptance of such modification."). But see MySpace.com Terms of Use Agreement, supra
note 196 ("MySpace reserves the right to modify this Agreement at any time and from
time to time, and each such modification shall be effective upon posting on the MySpace
Services. All material modifications will apply prospectively only. Your continued use of
the MySpace Services following any such modification constitutes your agreement to be
bound by and your acceptance of the Agreement as so modified. It is therefore important
that you review this Agreement regularly. If you do not agree to be bound by this Agree-
ment and to abide by all Applicable Law, you must discontinue use of the MySpace Ser-
vices immediately.").
288. See TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 693 F. Supp. 2d 370, 375-76 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
289. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Bill Me Later, Inc., No. CV 10-04461 SJO JCGX, 2010 WL
5289537, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010) (finding that a revised agreement bound a user who
had received "electronic notice via e-mail, announcing changes to the Original Agreement
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for increased assent mechanisms as discussed in Part III.A of this Arti-
cle.290 This type of notice would demonstrate the willingness of providers
to be transparent in their operations with respect to the unauthorized
posting of copyrighted content, as it is unreasonable for users to have to
compare two user agreements. Such a process might even be impossible
if the old user agreement becomes no longer accessible via the website.
Additionally, Internet and online service providers should provide in-
formation through their services about their efforts to enforce user agree-
ments against those users who post infringing content. Most of these
entities already provide their users with guidelines that intend to provide
education. 291 Providing awareness to these users that they will seek to
collect reasonable liquidated damages for the breach of contract that oc-
curs when a user infringes upon another's intellectual property rights via
the electronic forum will serve as an additional measure to dissuade this
unlawful conduct. This type of openness in enforcement is an important
final step in achieving an integrated strategy of digital copyright infringe-
ment deterrence.
IV. CONCLUSION
The user agreements that are currently utilized by the Internet and on-
line service providers that are most likely to be defendants in DMCA safe
harbor-related litigation are "not a substitute for intellectual property
protection. '292 Neither is the threshold compliance with the DMCA's re-
quirements for account termination by Internet and online service prov-
iders. Instead, alternative steps need to be taken by these entities to help
curb online copyright infringement. 293 One of these steps should be the
adoption of the three-part user agreement strategy advanced in this
Article.
By adopting this modest yet effective and cost-efficient approach, In-
ternet and online service providers can help copyright holders as well as
themselves. Without tortious activity that is violative of copyright law,
DMCA safe harbor-related litigation itself could become a nullity.294 It is
a solution that is reflective of both the innovative business practices that
and the effective date of those changes," that included a hyperlink to the revised
agreement).
290. See supra Part III.A.
291. See, e.g., YouTube Community Guidelines, supra note 222.
292. Sandeen, supra note 249, at 553.
293. For example, there have been arguments for the creation of a system of online
dispute resolution for certain Internet transactions. See Fred Galves, Virtual Justice As
Reality: Making the Resolution of E-Commerce Disputes More Convenient, Legitimate, Ef-
ficient, and Secure, 2009 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 1, 6 (2009) (advocating for Online
Dispute Resolution for e-commerce disputes). Perhaps, much of the unlawful conduct that
is associated with online copyright infringement could be resolved in this type of forum.
However, without such a forum in place, Internet and online service providers must take
action now to contribute to curbing this tortious activity of its users.
294. See, e.g., Memorandum of Law in Support of Viacom's Motion for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment on Liability and Inapplicability of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
Safe Harbor Defense at 1-4, Viacom Int'l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514
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can be utilized in the digital arena and a commitment to safeguarding
rights that extend back to the origins of American democracy. Further, it
is a solution that combines the normative values of contract and intellec-
tual property law, as it allows for an accord between the stakeholders
who are affected by online copyright infringement.295 Finally, it is a prag-
matic step toward limiting exposure to liability that could result in losses
of billions of dollars.296
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 1:07-cv-02103) (premising claims of liability on the foundation of user
copyright infringement).
295. See Ritchie, supra note 165, at 115-16 ("[Intellectual property and contract law]
share the general value of satisfying the reasonable expectations of the parties involved, as
well as a balancing of interests between the relevant stake holders, including the public.
Moreover, intellectual property rights, like contract rights, are primarily commercial.").
296. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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